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The United Nations estimated that to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals globally, 
they require approximately USD6 trillion per annum, totalling between USD90 to a USD100 
trillion of investments needed over the 15 years. African countries are struggling to finance 
their infrastructure development needs and require innovative solutions to finance their 
infrastructure gaps. The African Development Bank noted that Africa’s infrastructure needs 
can be estimated between USD130 and USD170 billion per annum with an estimated financ ing 
gap of USD68 billion to USD108 billion. Blended finance received international attention 
during the Third International Conference on Finance for Development in 2015 when it was 
mentioned in the adopted resolution report dubbed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (here forth 
the Addis Agenda). The overall objective of this study is to explore the private sector 
participation investing in economic infrastructure in Africa and the public sector’s 
understanding of blended finance. The research also focuses on the role of multi-and bilatera l 
development banks in mobilising the private sector and the government support required to 
attract private sector participation investing in infrastructure projects 
For this study, the Convergent Parallel Design mixed research method is employed where both 
the quantitative and qualitative data are collected concurrently or in the same phase. The World 
Bank PPI database is used as the primary quantitative data source, while nine qualitative in-
depth interviews were conducted. The results from the multiple linear regression model 
indicate that projects with multi- lateral development bank’ support are characterised by lower 
private sector participation in infrastructure investments in Africa. Furthermore, countries 
receiving concessional support from the International Development Association (IDA) are 
receiving lower private sector participation in their projects. In-depth interviews with public 
sector officials indicated that most of the officials had an overall understanding of blended 
finance in line with current market definitions. Officials, however, were not convinced with 
the use of concessional funding and loans in the blended finance structure due to the conditions 
precedents which came with it but felt like they had no choice but to accept these conditions 
due to the needs of the countries and the project involved. 
Informed by the findings of the study, the study recommends that blended finance should be 
localised for the African context and makes key policy recommendations linked to the OECD 
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1.1 Background of the research area 
Financing the global sustainable goals to achieve the 2030 targets is one of the greatest 
challenges facing the 193 global leaders who signed the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
declaration in 2015. The United Nations (UN) (2015a) estimated that to achieve the SDGs 
globally, they require approximately USD6 trillion per annum, totalling between USD90 to a 
USD100 trillion of investments needed over 15 years. The funding gap to achieve this target is 
estimated around USD2.5 to USD3 trillion dollars per annum after foreign direct investments 
(FDI), Official Development Assistance (ODA), and public funds towards the SDG’s are 
considered (United Nations, 2015b). A recent publication by the IMF revealed that emerging 
markets will require approximately USD 2.1 trillion additional spending and USD 0.5 trillion 
for low-income developing countries to deliver on the SDG goals in 2030 (Gaspar, Amaglobe li, 
Garcia-Escribano, Prady & Soto, 2019). The Sustainable Development Goal Centre for Africa 
(SDGC/Africa, 2019) estimated the SDG financing gap for Africa to be between USD500 
billion and USD1.2 trillion per annum with the likelihood of achieving the SDG goals gradually 
declining. 
Almost a half a decade after the launch of the SDGs, both the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2018) and the Blended Finance Taskforce (BFT) 
(2018) announced that the current rate of investments is not allowing for a critical impact in 
achieving the 2030 targets with debt levels alarmingly increasing in developing countries. 
Recent reports suggest that approximately 40% of low-income countries can either not service 
their current debt levels or is approaching high risk of debt distress (United Nations, 2014). 
Mustapha and Prizzon (2018:4) demonstrated in their analysis of the debt levels in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) that the composition of public external debt changed radically over the past few 
years since its peak in 2005 with a steady decrease in providing concessional debt by bilatera l 
and multilateral organisations to SSA countries. Mustapha et al. (2018:4) further noted that 
“[as] of 2016, multilateral debt accounted for less than 40% of external public debt on average, 
down from 53% in 2005”. The SDGC/Africa (2019) estimated that four (4) of every ten (10) 
African countries are currently experiencing debt distress. 
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Blended finance received international attention during the Third International Conference on 
Finance for Development in 2015 when it was mentioned in the adopted resolution report 
dubbed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (here forth the Addis Agenda). According to the UN 
General Assembly resolution adopted on 27 July 2015, members confirmed the importance of 
mobilising private sector investments by using public funds to achieve the SDGs by stating 
that “[an] important use of international public finance, including ODA, is to catalyse 
additional resource mobilisation from other sources, public and private… It can also be used 
to unlock additional finance through blended or pooled financing and risk mitigation, notably 
for infrastructure and other investments that support private sector development” (United 
Nations, 2015a:17). 
Blended finance, according to the Addis Agenda, is commonly referred to as combining non-
concessional private finance with concessional public and or philanthropic funding sources 
(United Nations, 2015a; United Nations, 2015b). The objective of using a blended finance 
approach is to attract more commercial finance into areas or sectors where the private sector 
would be reluctant to invest in and thus, create the “additionality” effect; as referred to by both 
the OECD and the World Economic Forum (WEF) (OECD & WEF, 2015a). The BFT (2018) 
reported that with blended finance, most of the investments in developing countries could be 
de-risked for the private sector and potentially generate an additional USD1 trillion in annual 
potential investments. This includes public-private partnerships that serve “to lower 
investment-specific risks and incentivize additional private sector finance across key 
development sectors led by regional, national and subnational government policies and 
priorities for sustainable development” (United Nations, 2015b :24-25). 
The Blended finance taskforce noted that since 2014, more than 50 blended finance facilit ie s 
and funds were launched with approximately 40% of these funds or facilities focusing only on 
the clean energy projects (BFT, 2018). According to the BFT (2018), most of these funds, 
while covering more than one region, targeted Africa, with SSA being the recipient of more 
grants than guarantees. Despite the focus on Africa, only nine countries, predominantly in 
North Africa, are consuming above the world average of 89% electrification, with less than 
half of the population in Africa having access to electricity (SDGC/Africa, 2019). The 
SDGC/Africa (2019) further reported that only six countries are above the threshold of having 
at least one basic clean water service within a 30-minute round trip in Africa, with nearly 40% 
of African countries only able to provide basic drinking service to less than two-thirds of their 
populations (SDGC/Africa, 2019). The expectation, however, is that the more blended finance 
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structures are being employed by the public sector, the more the private sector will be crowded 
into areas where they are the least expected to invest, including the water sector as mentioned 
above. Achieving the target of “universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking 
water for all”1 and affordable and clean energy to all by 2030, will require a radical increase in 
investments in Africa’s infrastructure. 
Convergence (2018) argues that blended finance is not a panacea for SDG’s to achieve but 
should rather be a structuring approach when investing in projects that contribute to achieving 
the SDGs than an investment tool. While the focus is on mobilising as much private sector 
participation through a blended finance approach as emphasised by many research institutions 
and think tanks, Convergence (2017) argued that governments’ throat within the blended 
finance debates have been silent and the real impact of it on governments in developing 
countries are still to be seen. In this sense, the role of the multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) and the local or national development finance institutions (DFIs) and the support they 
provide to African governments, specifically in achieving the SDGs and mobilising the private 
sector, becomes essential. 
This research is scoping the private sector investment activities in the economic infrastructure 
sectors linked to transport, energy, water and sewerage, and information and communicat ion 
technology (ICT) in Africa. These sectors are mostly captured under Goals 9, 6, 7, and 13 of 
the SDGs. Goal 9 of the SDGs focus specifically on industry, innovation, and infrastructure ; 
outlining eight specific targets, including supporting technology development, promoting 
industrialisation, and developing sustainable and resilient infrastructure (United Nations, 
2018a). Goal 6 focuses on clean water and sanitation, goal 7 includes affordable and clean 
energy, and goal 13 focuses on climate action (Walker, Pekmezoric & Walker, 2019). 
Various global research institutions and think tanks explored and analysed the concept and 
application of blended finance in the different economic sectors to understand how best a 
blended finance approach or structure could help in achieving the SDGs. There, however, 
remains a gap regarding how blended finance could be localised for the African continent and 
how public officials operating in the infrastructure space understand the concept of blended 
finance. 
                                                 
1 https://sdg-tracker.org/water-and-sanitation  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
With global institutions and leaders driving the mantra of roping more private sector 
investment into developing countries for sustainable development (Convergence, 2019), 
Collier (2014:38) asked the one pertinent question: “If private finance for African infrastructure 
is a good idea, why hasn't it happened already?” According to Collier (2014), some of the 
deterring factors preventing private sector investments include the high political risk, the 
increase costs of capital for governments itself, and the conditions that bind private investors 
when investing in foreign countries. One of the potentially biggest concerns, however, is the 
private cost of capital and their rate of returns in investing in a specific infrastructure project 
that might be greater than the costs at which a society could afford and invest in (Collier, 
2014:38). Collier (2014:39) argues that the private sector will not initiate and fund an 
infrastructure project that, from a social perspective, should most likely be undertaken by the 
government itself. 
The key question to be asked then is: How can blended finance help African governments 
mobilise additional private sector investments into their infrastructure projects? Despite these 
challenges, African governments are motivated to explore using blended finance as traditiona l 
investment approaches are not creating the impact as is expected. Globally, approximate ly 
USD3.3 trillion per annum is being spent on infrastructure alone with the bulk of this being 
funded from the balance sheets of governments, despite their deficit limitations and high debt 
levels (Samans, 2016). Research shows that of the USD3.3 trillion spent on infrastructure 
projects, only about USD400 billion can be contributed annually through traditional project 
finance markets that is not paid from the balance sheet of the sponsor, but rather from the 
cashflows of the project itself (Samans, 2016). 
African countries are struggling to finance their infrastructure development needs and require 
innovative solutions to finance their infrastructure gaps. The African Development Bank  
(AfDB) (2018) noted that Africa’s infrastructure needs could be estimated around USD130 to 
USD170 billion per annum with an estimated financing gap of USD68 billion to USD108 
billion. To mobilise more private sector investment into the SDGs, a multi-stakeholder group 
of DFIs are using their financing on commercial terms, blended with concessional funds to 
increase development impact and mobilise additional private sector investments (DFI Working 
Group, 2018). Concessional debt is usually referred to as loans that include an origina l 
minimum of 25% grant element and a long repayment tenure (Ezeaku, Nwakoby, Egbo & 
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Onwumere, 2019). Recent data show that the participating DFIs in 2017, financed projects to 
the value of approximately USD8.8 billion; using approximately USD3.9 billion of DFIs 
financing and USD1.2 billion of concessional funds (DFI Working Group, 2018). 
Approximately USD43 million of concessional commitments was allocated to infrastructure in 
SSA, while approximately USD121 million was allocated to North Africa. 
While the share of external debt’s maturity is largely long-term, de Soyres, Picco and Sab 
(2019) indicated that the share of concessional financing as a share of external debt decreased 
by 11% to 50% from 2000 to 2016, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, for frontier low-inco me 
development countries. De Soyres et.al. (2019) argue that low income developing (LID) 
countries’ cost of financing could increase due to the higher share of debt being issued at non-
concessional terms. 
Figure 1.1: Frontier LID countries: External Debt Characteristics (Concessional 
external debt – Percentage of total external debt) 
Source: de Soyres, Picco & Sab (2019: 10) 
 
Another traditional investment instrument, Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) also brought its 
challenges for Africa, especially regarding the regulatory frameworks required and the 
institutional capacity needed to drive the investment process. The World Bank (2012: 11) 
defines PPPs in general as “long-term contracts between a private party and a government 
agency for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risks 
and management responsibility”. 
The focus on crowding-in private sector financing into public infrastructure programmes is 
motivated by the available surplus capital within private coffers. This capital could be invested 
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into large infrastructure projects for a return, leaving the public sector with additiona l capital 
to spend on other important development projects (Tew, Caio, & Lonsdale, 2016). The 
challenge though is that there is no robust evidence that can prove the “financial additiona lity” 
of private finance catalysed through public sector financing. There also is no available proven 
evidence to show that blended finance will decrease the cost of the project for the public sector, 
especially as private capital requires a return given the opportunity cost (Martin, 2015). 
Various studies have explored the size and scope of blended finance on the African continent 
(Convergence, 2018; UNCDF, 2018). Convergence (2018), for example, which hosts a 
database of almost 500 organisations active in the blended finance space, reported that SSA 
remains one of the most targeted regions for blended finance deals (55%) with a deal size 
averaging around USD125 million. Few of these studies’, however, delft into the actual scope 
of the blended finance deals focusing on the African continent. Furthermore, while the DFI 
Working Group is reporting significant amounts of investments into Africa, why does 
Mustapha et al. (2018:4) note that multilateral debt accounted for less than 40% of external 
debt on average in 2016 alone? Limited recent research is showing the role and impact of mult i-  
and bilateral DFIs in mobilising the private sector to invest infrastructure projects in Africa. 
This research aims to fill the gap by exploring private sector investment in Africa by 
highlighting the relationship between multi- and bilateral DFIs in crowding-in the private 
sector in Africa’s infrastructure projects. It will further explore the government support 
required in the blended finance space and government or public sector officials’ understand ing 
of blended finance. 
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
1.3.1 Specific research objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to explore private sector participation investing in 
economic infrastructure in Africa and the public sector’s understanding of blended finance. 
More specifically, the objectives of this study include to: 
1. investigate the extent of private participation investing into Africa’s infrastructure 
projects; 
2. examine the relationship between MDBs or DFIs in crowding-in private sector 
participation investing into infrastructure projects in Africa; 
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3. investigate whether government support affects private sector participation investing in 
infrastructure projects; and 
4. explore the public sector’s understanding of blended finance 
1.3.2 Research questions 
The primary research questions for this study are as follow: 
1. What is the state of private sector participation investing in infrastructure projects in 
Africa? 
2. Is blended finance crowding-in more private sector participation into Africa’s 
infrastructure projects? 
3. What is the role of the MDBs and the DFIs in a blended finance structure and to what 
degree does an MDB or DFI’s participation in an infrastructure project influence the 
private sector to participate in investing in economic infrastructure projects in Africa? 
4. What is the public sector and or government’s understanding of blended finance? 
It is proposed that a mixed research approach including both quantitative and qualitat ive 
methods are used to explore the application of blended finance in Africa to attract additiona l 
private sector investments into infrastructure projects in this region. 
1.4 Justification of the research 
The traditional methods of project finance and PPPs have dominated infrastructure finance. 
These are known to delay project implementation due to its detailed risk assessment and 
contractual requirements. As previously mentioned, African countries do not have the means 
to achieve the SDGs and will require innovative financing methods or approaches to achieve 
these goals. Blended finance is but one of many new financing approaches proposed by the 
Addis Agenda. This is considered a niche market, but already supported by large organisations 
such as the WEF and the OECD. A BFT consisting of global private sector institutions, experts 
from multi- and bilateral DFIs, and experts from the different think tanks and internationa l 
bodies was established to ensure the focus and principles in applying the blended finance 
approach, specifically for investing in infrastructure projects, was developed and implemented.  
Despite the vast interest in this topic, limited empirical research has been conducted in the 
African region. More specifically, the voice of public officials in African governments and 
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institutions is silent around the topic regarding its effectiveness to mobilise private sector 
participation into Africa’s infrastructure. It is thus imperative that more empirical research is 
conducted that will inform the current research paradigm around the viability and application 
of blended finance. 
The main contribution of this research is to add to the literature on blended finance and the 
factors contributing to private sector participation, specifically in infrastructure projects in 
Africa. While many research studies focused on the determinants for MDBs to participate in 
infrastructure projects and the mobilisation effects to crowd private sector investments into 
infrastructure projects, the researcher was unable to find, to the best of his knowledge, studies 
that identified blended finance as a key driver for private sector mobilisation through the MDBs 
or DFIs in Africa. 
1.5 Research assumptions 
The researcher accepts that there are no one quantitative database that has available all the 
information needed to explore the impact of a blended finance approach in Africa, capturing 
all the necessary instruments that could determine using blended finance in Africa. The World 
Bank PPI database, which focuses on private participation investments into public sector 
infrastructure projects, is a public available database that will be used as a core database for 
analysis. It will be supplemented with data from the World Banks’ International Debt Statistics 
database and the World Bank’s SDGs’ Data Catalogue. The researcher will further be led by 
the detailed literature review to define the key variables for analysis, which will provide insight 
for the interview schedule. It is further assumed that officials from the government or public 
sector operating in the economic infrastructure space will be available for interviews. 
1.6 Organisation of the dissertation 
This research dissertation is organised as follow. 
Chapter 1 created the context informing the motivation behind exploring blended finance as 
an approach to mobilise private sector participation in investing in Africa’s infrastructure to 
achieve the infrastructure development targets of the SDGs. 
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Chapter 2 provides an overall literature review outlining the conceptual debate behind the 
focus of using blended finance as a mechanism to finance infrastructure in Africa, highlighting 
the key benefits for developing countries and the current state of Africa’s infrastructure needs.  
Chapter 3 outlines the mixed methodological approach used to explore blended finance on the 
African continent. 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data collected. 
The research will be concluded in Chapter 5 with an interpretation of the mixed results, 
policy recommendations for Africa based on the OECD blended finance principles, and 










































This chapter deliberates in detail the literature available on blended finance. The first section 
focuses on the state of Africa’s infrastructure and its investment needs. The second section 
concentrates on the conceptual debate as applicable to blended finance, the stakeholder 
dynamics and the instruments at play. Finally, an investigation into the empirical literature and 
evidence conducted to date is reviewed, stressing the need for additional empirical research on 
blended finance specifically for the African context. 
AFRICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS 
2.2 Taking stock of Africa’s infrastructure needs 
Africa’s economic infrastructure is in a dire state with its energy supply being notorious ly 
unreliable. The continent’s need for energy is reported as Africa’s biggest challenge (Kodongo 
& Ojah, 2016). It is estimated that by 2050, less than 40% of African countries will reach 
universal access to electricity (Estache, A., & Wodon, 2014; Eberhard, Foster, Briceño-
Garmendia, Ouedraogo, Camos, Shkaratan, 2008). More than 30 SSA countries experience 
regular power shortages and interruptions with an estimated 46% of the share of the African 
population in 2014 having access to electricity (Foster & Briceño-Ganmendia, 2010; AfDB, 
2018). This accounts for less than half of the reported percentage of the total population having 
access to electricity in Latin America (Foster & Briceño-Ganmendia, 2010; AfDB, 2018). 
Hallegatte, Rentschler and Rozenberg (2019) referenced a study conducted by Mensah (2016) 
showing that in 14 countries in SSA, a 1% increase in electricity outages could lead to company 





Figure 2.1: An Increase in Power Outages Lead to Lower Company Productivity in 
African Countries2 
Source: Hallegatte et al. (2019) extracted from Mensah (2016) 
 
▪ GDP per capita (right scale) 
• Decrease in productivity resulting from 1% increase in outages  
 
SSA countries spend on average 2.7%, with some 4% of their GDP on the energy sector with 
little luck receiving increased financing into the energy sector due to inefficiencies of most of 
the energy utilities in the region (Eberhard et al., 2008). Access to sanitation, on the other hand, 
improved slightly to around 39% in 2013, but only an estimated 34% of rural Africans have 
access to sanitation (AfDB, 2018). Kodongo and Ojah (2016) report that while 64% of the 
population in SSA countries do have access to improved drinking water, these water resources 
remain unsustainably managed and underdeveloped. As mentioned earlier, more recent data 
shows that about 40% of African countries can provide basic drinking water services to less 
than two-thirds of their populations (SDGC/A, 2019). 
The road density of SSA is reported to be around 204 kilometres (kms) of road per 1 0002 km 
of land area; far below the world average of 944 kms (Kodongo & Ojah, 2016). Regarding 
ICT, AfDB (2018) recorded mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 population around 73 
subscriptions in Africa (97 in Latin America), while only one fixed broadband subscription per 
100 population was recorded compared to the nine (9) subscriptions in Latin America. 
                                                 
2 The percentage decrease in productivity in shown in the left scale (dots) resulting from a 1% increase in 
outages. The GPD per capita of the countries analysed is captured in the right scale (bars) in US$ (Hallegatte, 
Rentschler & Rozenberg, 2019). 
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Low-income countries experience the worst infrastructure deficits in Africa, which is further 
combined with the lack of proper infrastructure in fragile states compared to the more affluent 
middle-income countries such as South Africa and Mauritius (Ncube, 2010). Sixteen of 
Africa’s 54 countries are defined as landlocked countries, which, according to Kodongo 
(2013), is further retarding economic growth for the SSA region and is an added distraction for 
foreign trade and investments. Of the global 47 least developed countries (LDCs), 33 are in 
Africa (UNCDF, 2018). Development partners and African governments all agree about the 
continents’ massive infrastructure gaps and the negative impact it has on both the social and 
economic development of the continent (Kodongo, 2013; Kodongo & Ojah, 2016). 
2.3 Mind the Gap – Balancing Africa’s infrastructure funding gap and its sovereign 
debt crises 
“The infrastructure deficit condemns Africa to perform below its economic potential… 
Infrastructure services in Africa cost twice as much on average as in other developing 
regions and are exceptionally high by global standards” (Ncube, 2010:74). 
Ncube’s (2010) statement above speaks to the heart of Africa’s infrastructure and investment 
challenges, further escalating the funding gap; that is, Africa’s infrastructure deficits and the 
increased cost of infrastructure services. As previously mentioned, Africa’s infrastructure 
financing needs escalated to between USD130 to USD170 billion per annum, with a maximum 
funding gap estimated at USD107.5 billion (AfDB, 2018)3. This is an increase from the 
previous much-publicised estimated figure of USD93 billion (i.e. 15% of Africa’s GDP) 
required per annum, with a financing gap of nearly USD31 billion per year to address Africa’s 
infrastructure investment needs (Foster & Briceño-Ganmendia, 2010). It is predicted that by 
2040, Africa’s total infrastructure investments needs is projected to be around USD4.3 trillion 
with an estimated annual funding need of USD174 billion (Global Infrastructure Hub & Oxford 
Economics, 2018). This is aligned to the estimated projections of the AfDB (2018). 
African governments, as many other countries across the world, endures the most of financ ing 
the infrastructure they so desperately need. The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA, 
2018) tracks the investments into Africa’s infrastructure annually through data provided by its 
                                                 
3 The estimated infrastructure investments need of the AfDB excludes the current financing commitment made by donors to 
fill the infrastructure deficit (AfDB, 2018). However, FDI and donor commitments such as ODA, is still not enough to fill 




various members, including data provided by, for example, the G7 countries, local DFIs, and 
multi- and bilateral institutions.4 Aligned to the findings of previous researchers (Foster et.al., 
2010; Kodongo, 2013; Kodongo & Ojah, 2016), Figure 2.2 confirms that most of the financ ing 
commitments towards Africa’s infrastructure is still coming from African governments (ICA, 
2018). On average, between 2012 and 2017, African National Governments committed 
approximately USD30.8 billion towards infrastructure projects (ICA, 2018). Despite 
experiencing a sharp decline reported in 2015 due to the commodity price shock, infrastructure 
financing commitments still increased to approximately USD34 billion in 2017. 
Figure 2.2: Commitments Towards Financing Africa’s Infrastructure (USD Billions) 
Source: Authors Compilation from Source: ICA 2018 & 2017 reports 
 
 
When reviewing government’s expenditure into infrastructure, the AfDB (2018) reported that 
between 2008 and 2015 the ratio of expenditure to GDP for Africa increased; however, the 
ratio of total government’s revenue to GDP during the same period, remained flat. SSA 
countries’ median level of public debt at the end of 2017 already exceeded 50% of the GDP, 
with fiscal deficits remaining large (IMF, 2018, p10). The economic crises of 2008/09 caused 
many donor countries and institutions to tighten their belts with a decrease in concessiona l 
                                                 
4 At the time of the publication the G7 countries included Canada, who was the Chair of the ICA, Germany, Italy, France, 
Japan, UK and the USA, (Russia was included, previously G8, before it was suspended in 2014). Data is also provided by  
the selected Regional Economic Communities in Africa. South Africa is the only G20 member also providing investment 
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funding to developing countries, with African countries receiving only a slight increase in 2015 
(AfDB, 2018). African governments have no option but to be highly dependent on deficit 
financing to finance their infrastructure needs through public borrowings from multi- and 
bilateral institutions, commercial banks, and the national and international capital markets or 
requesting grants or loans from foreign government institutions (Foster & Briceño-Ganmend ia, 
2010; Kodongo, 2013; Ncube, 2010; AfDB, 2018). 
The IMF (2018) argues that the high reliance of SSA countries on foreign currency borrowing 
to fund development activities such as infrastructure development is a further source of 
vulnerability of debt distress for these countries. SSA’s foreign-currency-denominated public 
debt increased by approximately 40% from 2010/2013 to 2017, and on average, accounted for 
an estimated 60% of total public debt in 2017 (IMF, 2018: 11). Mustapha et al. (2018) concedes 
that borrowing is in most instances a prerequisite for growth. They, however, emphasised that 
unsustainable debt only increases the risks to not achieve the SDGs and further compels 
governments to spend less on infrastructure and more on debt servicing. 
Researchers are exploring different possible financing options available to finance Africa’s 
infrastructure deficits, which include using diaspora bonds, issuing infrastructure indexed 
bonds and infrastructure bonds, increase private savings to, for example, developing local 
capital markets, mobilising domestic resources, and financing low-carbon infrastructure by 
tapping into the carbon finance markets (Kodongo, 2013; Ncube, 2010). PPP financ ing 
mechanisms are regarded as one of the more preferred instruments to use in Africa. PPPs are 
usually structured as bilateral contracts between a government institution and a private 
concession operator (Arezki, Bolton, Peters, Samama & Stiglitz; 2017:224). The IMF (2018) 
noted that compared to the rest of the world, SSA recorded the highest average ratio of PPP 
projects to GDP at 1.4% for the year 2000 compared to 1% in other regions of the world. PPP 
projects in SSA are mainly located in the transport and energy sectors and tend to bring the 
project cost down and further increase strong competition between private sector entities in the 
process (IMF, 2018:69). 
A lack of regulatory and institutional capacity in the PPP field has led to more disputed projects 
in this region. “Since 2006, the value of disputed projects in SSA as a share of a countries’ 
GDP has averaged three-quarters of a percent of GDP, which is the highest ratio among 
emerging markets and developing countries” (IMF, 2018: 69). The IMF (2018) highlights that 
using PPPs without the necessary expertise and institutional frameworks could transmit into 
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several fiscal risks, which could include governments providing some form of debt guarantee, 
implying contingent liabilities for the governments providing the guarantee. This could lead to 
disputed or failed projects. Groenfeldt (2018) claims that within developing countries, the 
bankers who are arranging the PPPs tend to have more expertise to develop and evaluate these 
complex contracts than the governments requiring the assets or services and, at times, even 
requires further re-negotiations or subsidies from the host countries. Groenfeldt (2018) is 
unconvinced by the blended finance drive to achieve the SDGs and claims that it is, just as 
PPPs, another form of joint-funding; labelling it as being “lipstick on the public-priva te 
partnership pig.” 
In summary, Africa’s massive socio-economic challenges and the great need for proper 
infrastructure with limited available funding are curbing most African countries to drive 
economic growth in these countries and negatively affect Africa’s goal to achieve the 2030 
SDGs. In the next section, the historical nature of blended finance will be explored in more 
depth, highlighting the complexity behind its conceptual understanding, the role players 
involved, and how blended finance is structured. 
CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE 
2.4 Tracing the history of blended finance 
Historically, international institutions such as the World Bank practised blended finance, long 
before its mention in the 2015 Addis Agenda. For example, several of the instruments in this 
research, such as using concessional funding provided to developing countries and public 
guarantees, are not entirely new in structuring infrastructure investment projects. Tew, Caio 
and Lonsdale (2016) stipulate that the practice of blended finance could be traced back to more 
than a hundred years ago where governments in the domestic context were using public 
guarantees or incentives to de-risk investments into public sector projects. In 1945, for 
example, the established United States Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) used 
blended finance to implement the Marshall plan, while the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), known for using blended finance instruments, was established during the mid-1950s. 
The rise of blended finance and the importance of development and multilateral financ ing 
institutions became more evident in the 21st Century, and especially, towards the final few 
years of the Millennium Development Goals (Tew et al., 2016). Annexure A provides a 
timeline of some examples of the international historical events that led to the rise and current 
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interest in using blended finance as a financing structure or mechanism to achieve the SDGs. 
It also includes launching new networking and deal platforms such as the WEF/OECD 
Sustainable Development Investment Partnership (SDIP) initiative to scale private finance, the 
Convergence deal sourcing platform, and the most recent BFT. 
Despite the historical nature of blended finance, none of the institutions or various platforms 
share the same definition on blended finance. In the next section, the researcher will further 
unravel the different blended finance understandings. 
2.5 Different blended finance definitions 
There is no universally accepted definition for blended finance as a standard across all sectors 
or geographies. A think tank publication identified around 15 different blended finance 
definitions with different unique characteristics (Tew et.al., 2016), while the UNCDF identified 
more than three dozen blended finance definitions that were found in various publications 
(UNCDF, 2018). It is thus not surprising that in a study conducted in LDCs, the UNCDF (2018) 
found that most of their respondents had diverse understandings of blended finance (UNCDF, 
2018). 
Table 2.1 highlights a select number of definitions provided by various researchers before the 
Addis Agenda 2015 referred to blended finance as combining “concessional public finance and 
non-concessional private finance and expertise from the public and private sector” (United 
Nations, 2018b: 17). From the definitions in the table, some key characteristics can be 
highlighted: 
• Blended finance could refer to different sources of financing combined from both the 
public sector and the private sector. 
• A blended finance approach could involve using various financing instruments and 
sources of financing; mixing loans and grants for development with some form of 
concessional component in place. Loans tend to be on concessional or market terms 
making projects viable. Grants or aid tend to be linked with ODA funding (Bilal & 
Krätke, 2013; Mustapha et al., 2014; Nunez, Ferrer & Behrens, 2011; Romero & Van 
Der Poel, 2014). Bilal and Krätke (2013), for example, links using blended finance, 
specifically focusing on the EU, with that of a grant aid from ODA and other sources 
of public or private finances such as risk capital and or equity and loans. 
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• The definition of blended finance could be contextual, as a few of the researchers 
specifically focuses on EU-blended instruments. This implies that the definition of 
blended finance is potentially dependent on the mandate of the institution applying 
blended finance. 
Table 2.1. Selected Definitions on Blended Finance  
 
Source: Author’s compilations 
 
• There is a focus on the various stakeholders involved in the blended finance mechanism 
that could include DFIs, governments, and commercial lenders. 
• There is also a focus on leveraging private capital using official or public funds. 
Leverage is one of the key characteristics identified by the WEF/OECD (2015) where they 
defined blended finance as the strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to 
mobilise capital flows to emerging and frontier markets (WEF/OECD, 2015: 4). The 
WEF/OECD’s definition motivates using philanthropic and development funds to leverage 
more private capital into those markets where the private sector would not necessarily invest, 
using various instruments to make the project viable for the private sector. For the WEF/OECD 
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(2015), blended finance is not only about leveraging the private sector, but also to ensure the 
investments have an impact that drives economic, social, and environmental growth. It should 
simultaneously create financial returns for the private sector that is based on the real and 
perceived risks and is in line with market expectations (WEF/OECD, 2015). While the focus 
on impact or development impact is not new compared to previous definitions and their 
characteristics reviewed, the focus on risk-return is an important component that is emphasised 
in blended finance structures. 
The definition of blended finance evolved further as key stakeholders provided their input and 
understanding of using blended finance. The multi-stakeholder group of DFIs view blended 
finance as using their financing on commercial terms, which can be blended with concessiona l 
funds (philanthropic or ODA) to increase development impact (DFI Working Group, 2018). 
More specifically, the DFI Working Group (2017:3) defined blended concessional finance 
specifically for private sector projects as “[c]ombining concessional finance from donors or 
third parties alongside DFIs’ normal own account finance and or commercial finance from 
other investors, to develop private sector markets, address the SDGs, and mobilise private 
resources”. The DFI Working Group’s definition is different than that defined by the EU (see 
Ferrer & Behrens, 2011) and is focused more directly on supporting the private sector by 
blending with available concessional resources. The DFI Working Group and the EU’s 
conceptualisation of blended finance proves how definitions of blended finance are 
inconsistent with that of other institutions but that the understanding of blended finance is 
shaped by the constituencies and the mandates of the different institutions (Mustapha et al., 
2014). 
The OECD revised their definition by stating that “blended finance is the strategic use of 
development finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards sustainab le 
development in developing countries” (OECD, 2018a:50). Where, initially, blended finance 
was specifically focused on mobilising private capital to emerging and frontier markets, the 
OECD is now stating that these funds mobilised should be targeted specifically for developing 
countries, a much more general targeted group, and further noting that it does not have to be 
concessional. The OECD (2018a: 50) is clear in their analysis of blended finance that the 
definition they developed is specifically targeted to support development finance providers and 
“donor governments in moving towards more effective blended finance” and that using blended 
finance for sustainable development projects could include using either concessional or non-
concessional funding or even both. By noting that blended finance transactions could either be 
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concessional or non-concessional, the OECD is acknowledging the needs of the MDBs or that 
of the DFI Working Group who focus on crowding-in the private sector with concessiona l 
instruments. Table 2.2. provides an overview of the operational differences between the 
definition of the OECD (2018a) and that of the DFI Working Group (2017 & 2018). 
Table 2.2: Comparing Definitions of Blended Finance between OECD DAC and DFI 
Working group 
 
Source: OECD (2018a:51) 
The OECD (2018a) focuses on the mobilisation of financing for development, specifica lly 
from commercial sources. They add that the investee could be public or private and that the 
financiers could include DFIs, governments, and or foundations of which resources could be 
either concessional or non-concessional (OECD, 2018a). The DFI Working Group’s approach 
focuses on private investments, emphasising supporting the private sector through the 
deployment of concessional financing to minimise the risks associated with these projects 
(OECD, 2018a). 
The OECD (2018a:22-23) emphasised that their focus is from a policy perspective and 
highlights specific tenets that should be acknowledged when adopting their definition of 
blended finance: 
1. The finance that is mobilised should not be available for that specific project without 
blending and could be accepted as additional. 
2. The development finance contribution is catalysing the additional mobilised finance. 
3. It is not the source of the funding provided, but more the purpose (development) that is 
important. 
4. Blending is not determined on concessionality. 
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5. Blended finance is not a replacement for commercial sector development – in essence, 
financing provided to the commercial sector at market rates for specific projects cannot 
be considered as blended finance 
As summarised by the OECD (2018a), the rationale for blending remains the mobilisation of 
additional investment and or private capital for development. The various definitions 
identified, however, could be classified within two specific dimensions: (1) whether the 
blended transaction is concessional or non-concessional, and (2) the participating actors 
involved in the transaction, i.e. public-private, private-private, or public-public cooperation. 
The OECD’s recent definition will be used as a working definition for this research, 
considering the role of development finance institutions (MDBs or DFIs) in mobilising private 
sector participation in investing in infrastructure, specifically, in Africa. 
2.6 Key actors in a blended finance structure 
This section will highlight the role of four key role players in the blended finance ecosystem, 
which include the MDBs/DFIs, the private sector, the governments of developing countries, 
and philanthropic funders as key players extracted from the definitions discussed above. 
The Gate Keeping & Unlocking role of the MDBs/DFIs 
The traditional role of the MDBs and other DFIs in the infrastructure space were always to 
invest in projects that shows development impact and where the private banks are unwilling to 
invest in large scale long-term infrastructure projects (Arezki, Bolton, Peters, Samama & 
Stiglitz, 2017). MDBs’ mandate is to support development-oriented programmes and reduce 
both market and government failures by assisting governments to originate, develop, and 
structure their public sector infrastructure projects (Arezki et.al., 2017). 
MDBs tend to conduct vigorous planning and due diligence of all infrastructure projects to 
ensure that it all fits within a broader infrastructure development plan by employing their 
inhouse expertise, conducting detailed risk assessments, and managing balance sheet 
structuring by matching it with, for example, long-term assets and long-term liabilities (Arezki 
et al., 2017). “The mandate of MDBs evolved as the central role of the state in the economy 
was reassessed and developing economies transitioned away from large public sectors towards 
more market-based models” (Arezki et al., 2017:242). This shift required development banks 
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to mobilise more private sector participation into development-oriented projects, and, where 
necessary, co-invest with the private sector into these projects. 
Because of the latter, MDBs are emphasised as key role players in the institutional mechanism 
to finance the 2030 SDGs and to crowd-in the private sector (Arezki et al., 2017). MDBs can 
mitigate political risk and market failures since most of their shareholder memberships on their 
governing structures are represented by international governments (Arezki et al., 2017:249). 
According to Arezki et al. (2017) development banks can attract private investors as co-
investors into infrastructure projects by leveraging public money through committed capital 
from government contributions and encourage investment- friendly environments through 
macro-economic stability and growth (Arezki et al., 2017; Broccolini, Lotti, Maffioli, & 
Stucchi, 2018). An MDB’s participation in an infrastructure project that is not immediate ly 
attracting private sector attention due to the various risks involved could, on the other hand, 
signal some trust to private investors to invest in such a project (Basilio, 2014). The MDBs 
could, through their support to a country in reforming its investments, the various credit 
enhancement products, and guarantees they have to offer, improve their preferred creditor 
status, and their technical expertise could raise the creditworthiness of a project and thus, attract 
more private capital flow to a project (Broccolini et al., 2018). 
Although MDBs are at times also required to co-invest with the private sector, they are 
fundamentally different from commercial banks because where a project is commercia lly 
viable, an MDB is not required to invest in such a project and MDBs should always first 
consider the social and economic development impact of a project before investing in it. Arezki 
et al. (2017) note that the MDB debt will, in most cases, be senior to other creditors in the 
project structure. 
Despite their key role to crowd-in the private sector and, where necessary, co-invest with the 
private sector, development banks do have limited funds available for infrastructure projects. 
Compared to the needs of the countries it services and their narrow capital base and 
conservative loan approach, MDBs do not necessarily allow for scaling up significant lending 
to infrastructure projects in those countries whose financing demands well exceed the supply 
MDBs can finance directly (Broccolini et al., 2018; Arezki et al., 2017). While governance 
structure comprises mainly of international government representatives, the private sector 
might feel that the actual needs of the private sector are not always being addressed. Later in 
this chapter, the researcher will highlight the key blended finance principles of the DFI 
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Working Group (2017) identified as an approach to crowd-in the private sector into financ ing 
the SDGs. 
Private Sector – the beneficiaries of blended finance? 
The private sector is a key recipient of the blended finance benefits; however, they are cautious 
of investing in the SDGs. Oppenheim and Stodulka (2017) argue that for the private sector to 
be crowded into the blended finance space and have them help fill the SDG gap, one must 
understand that (1) the private sector is a miscellaneous beast with many mandates, and (2) one 
must be clear what is required for the private sector to invest in at scale. First, excluding the 
usual commercial and investment bankers, there is also a need to recognise the institutiona l 
investors and asset owners (including the pension funds and sovereign wealth funds). There 
are also asset managers that include private equity firms and wealth managers, and finally, it 
should include project developers. Excluding the ones mentioned by Oppenheim and Stodulka 
(2017), there, however, is further a need to recognise the local domestic banks and their local 
pools of institutional capital. Dasgupta and Ratha (2000:1-2), for example, investigated which 
determinants drive private capital flow into a developing country and found that non-FDI 
portfolio flows tend to increase when: 
• there is an increase in the current account deficit; 
• there is a rise in FDI flows; 
• there is a higher per capita income, and 
• there is growth performance in the country. 
Second, Oppenheim and Stodulka (2017:2) argue that there is a need to break down the 
different perceptions of risks when investing in sustainable infrastructure projects and highlight 
three key action items: 
• improve the enabling environment; 
• drive deal flow through project development; and 
• mobilise more institutional capital into infrastructure investments. 
At the end, it is about the private sector and the MDBs and DFIs working together to drive 
investment at scale into sustainable infrastructure projects. The private sector will ensure that 
the infrastructure projects are economically viable and not politically motivated (Arezki et al., 
2017). The MDBs, on the other hand, will conduct most of the project preparation work on a 
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project for investment and mitigate the risks the private investors identify as barriers for 
investments. One concern from Arezki et al. (2017) is that the MDB/DFIs tend to bring the 
private sector into the project development stage fairly late; at the point where the main deal 
structuring has already been set, having the private sector act too much as a passive player in 
the development of the project (Arezki et al., 2017). The authors propose that the private sector 
should be crowded into projects much earlier for a project to achieve viability status. 
Governments from developing countries – the silent partner5 
The majority investors into infrastructure projects to date in Africa, as mentioned earlier, is the 
government or public sector in Africa (ICA, 2018; AfDB, 2018). In a recent publication of 
Sustainable Energy for All (SeforALL) (2019) it is argued that government should be leading 
the drive for investment using blended finance into the energy sector. The authors of this 
publication proposed that “governments have the ability to secure concessional financing from 
multilateral and bilateral development partners that can be used to provide risk-tolerant 
financing to enterprises. This can in turn crowd-in more commercial capital from investors” 
(SeforAll, 2019: 19). Simultaneously, too much government involvement in the financ ia l 
closing discussions of a project, however, could also be a deterrent for some private sector 
investors (OECD/UNCDF, 2019). Given this, government has become the silent partner in 
most infrastructure project finance deals that involved the private sector, with their key role 
only to ensure the enabling investment environment is in place, that is, the right policies and 
regulations for the private sector to invest in a specific project or sector is available. 
The OECD/UNCDF (2019:12) recently reported that in trying to achieve the SDGs, the 
financing models will be in play, whether that is blended finance and or PPPs. Governments, 
however, must take the “driver’s seat in determining which approach works best where”. In a 
recent case study of Uganda, the authors reported that public sectors officials are unaware of 
the term blended finance but can speak PPPs or can refer to financing instruments such as 
guarantees (Kasirye & Lakal, 2019). They, however, did warn that for government officials to 
drive blended finance, there is a serious skills gap that must be addressed, and this could be 
presumed for most of the LDCs in Africa. 
So, while there is a need for government to be more vocal in the development and financing of 
infrastructure projects in the region, it appears as though a lack of understanding of blended 
                                                 
5 Donor governments remain a key player in the blended finance ecosystem, but the funding support tend to be covered under 
ODA as referred to earlier. 
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finance and their lack of confidence and capacity in the project finance space is still curbing 
developing countries’ governments to participate in the structuring discussions (Convergence, 
2017). Furthermore, the private sector perceives that governments’ participation in these deals 
could further delay the project from being implemented. One of the objectives of this study is 
to explore governments’ understanding of blended finance and whether government support 
attract or deter private sector participation in infrastructure projects in Africa. 
Philanthropic funders 
Philanthropic funders are key contributors in the blended finance ecosystem. Convergence 
(2018, 2019) and the DFI Working Group (2018, 2019) include philanthropic funders as part 
of the development funding partners who can provide concessional funds to fill the gap in a 
blended finance structure in financing a project. According to the WEF/OECD (2015), 
philanthropic funders play a major role in unlocking and improving the local investment 
markets, especially in the frontier and emerging markets. This study, however, will not focus 
on the role of the philanthropic funders specifically, due to the limited data that are availab le 
in the market. 
2.7 Blended finance structure & instruments 
The objective of blended finance is to apply various financial instrument that could include 
loans, guarantees, grants, and equities. The overall aim of blended finance is thus to improve 
the risk-return profile for commercial investors who, in different circumstances, would not 
have invested without public intervention (Convergence, 2017; United Nations, 2018b). In line 
with the latter, the WEF also (2016) noted that risk-adjusted returns should already be in line 
with market expectations. 
Convergence (2018, 2019) argues that blended finance is neither an investment instrument nor 
is it an investment approach. Blended finance should be understood as a ‘structuring approach’ 







Figure 2.3: The Structure and Mechanics of Blended Finance 




Convergence (2019: 7) identifies four common blended finance structures: 
1. Public or philanthropic investors make available funds below market terms to either 
provide an additional layer of protection to private investors or to lower the overall cost 
of capital. 
2. Philanthropic and public investors provide credit enhancements in the form of 
insurances or guarantees at below market terms. 
3. A technical assistance facility is provided towards the transaction to strengthen the 
commercial viability and development impact of the deal either pre- or post-investment. 
4. The preparation funding of the project is grant-funded from a public or philanthrop ic 
investor to attract private and institutional investors. 
The mechanic of the structure requires the development capital to be raised or provided by a 
public or philanthropic funder to mobilise private capital. The development capital partner will 
provide concessional funding towards the transaction while the private/institutional investor  
will provide capital at market rates to form a blended finance structure. 
The structure provided by Convergence is aligned to the initial structure presented by 
WEF/OECD (2015), as captured in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Financial Instruments Commonly Used in Blended Finance 
Source: WEF/OECD (2015: 15) 
 
The WEF/OECD (2015:15) postulate that by “mobilizing private capital to new markets or 
sectors can require support, either by reducing risks or increasing returns when the risks are 
high”. While the instruments and structures in play are similar, Convergence emphasises the 
role of the philanthropic and public funders in providing concessional funding to the blended 
finance structure. 
This study will not so much focus on the instruments being used to achieve a blended finance 
structure but will focus more on the mechanics to achieve that structure. The focus will be on 
whether MDBs have a significant role to play in mobilising private sector participat ion 
investment into infrastructure projects and whether using concessional funds and the support 
of governments do attract private capital flow. 
2.8 The ‘principle’ debate around blended finance 
As different institutions and organisation started cementing their roles in the blended finance 
ecosystem, so did they start redefining the principles around how blended finance could be 
effectively applied. Two significant organisations that developed their set of principles as 
applicable to their constituencies and definitions is the OECD for Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) member countries and the DFI Working Group. Table 2.3 outlines the 




Table 2.3: OECD & DFI Working Group Blended Finance Principles 
Source: OECD (2018b); DFI Working Group (2017) 
OECD DAC Blended Finance 
Principles 
DFI Working Group 
1. Anchor blended finance use to a 
development Rationale 
1. Additionality/Rationale for Using Blended 
Concessional Finance 
2. Design blended finance to increase 
the mobilisation of commercial 
finance 
2. Crowding-in and Minimum 
Concessionality 
3. Tailor blended finance to local 
context 
3. Commercial Sustainability 
4. Focus on effective partnering for 
blended finance 
4. Reinforcing Markets 
5. Monitor blended finance for 
transparency and results 
5. Promoting High Standards 
 
The OECD (2018b) is clear in their motivation for the principles they adopted. The objective 
is for these principles to reflect the directives as received from their DAC donors, includ ing 
that the instruments and policies is as per their political oversight. The DFI Working Group 
(2018, 2019), which include the European DFIs and the MDB heads, approved the DFI 
enhanced principles in October 2017, focusing on using concessional financing to mobilise 
private capital. The DFI blended finance principle is commercially focused with the objective 
to crowd-in the commercial sector into projects where they otherwise would not invest and 
stipulate that concessional funding should only be used where it is proven that a project cannot 
be commercially structured or when the project is not viable with commercial financing. 
The OECD is not fully disagreeing with the concessional approach of the DFI Working Group, 
but emphasise, as previously mentioned, that both non-concessional and concessiona l 
development finance could be included in a blended finance structure. The OECD (2018b) 
highlights “partnering for blending” and tailoring blended finance for the local context, which 
is not specifically emphasised in the principles or the guidelines of the DFI Working Group. 
Instead, the DFI Working Group (2019: 25) under the reinforcing markets principle states, as 
a guideline, that “DFI assistance to the private sector should be structured to effectively and 
efficiently address market failures and minimise the risk of disrupting or unduly distorting 
markets or crowding out private finance, including new entrants”. It is unclear whether this is 
targeting local investors. It, however, is focusing on the general task of a DFI, which is to 
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address market failures in a country or in a specific sector. While these are two different sets 
of principles with a focus more on the needs of their constituencies regarding how they wish 
to apply blended finance, the question is whether the local context, in this case, the African 
continent, requires its own set of principle of how best blended finance should be driven in 
Africa? 
EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
2.9 Blended finance studies 
Benn, Sangaré and Hos (2017) conducted a survey commissioned by the OECD DAC, focusing 
on those amounts mobilised from the private sector due to the interventions made by offic ia l 
development financing (OECD, 2018; Benn et al., 2017). The survey targeted multi- and 
bilateral DFIs, aid-agencies, and institutions focused on resource mobilisation such as 
investment funds and public-private partnerships with a development mandate. One of the key 
objectives explored the amounts mobilised through financing instruments, includ ing 
guarantees, syndicated loans, shares in collective investment vehicles, direct investments in 
companies, and credit lines (OECD, 2018; Benn et al., 2017). The study is significant because 
it is the first of its kind to explore the different leveraging instruments used to crowd-in private 
sector funding through public finance, focusing on blended finance. In Figure 2.5, for example, 
the survey highlighted that between 2012 and 2015 through the assistance of offic ia l 
development finance, approximately USD81 billion were mobilised from the private sector by 
leveraging the various mobilisation instruments used. Guarantees is by far the most used 










Figure 2.5: Financial Instruments Commonly Used in Blended Finance 
 
 
Source: Benn et al. (2017: 4) 
Credit lines were targeted for upper- and lower-income countries, while most of the mobilised 
funds went to middle-income countries. The survey showed that middle-income countries are 
still the biggest recipient (77%) of funds mobilised for projects with only 7% of the funds 
mobilised in LDCs, and 3% mobilised for projects in other low-income countries (Benn et al., 
2017, OECD, 2018). This result is disconcerting, as the recent The Least Developed Countries 
Report 2017 shows that 33 of the 47 LDCs in the world are in Africa (UNCTAD, 2017). 
Despite this alarming statistic, Africa mobilised approximately 30% (USD 24.3 billion) of the 
funds through these mentioned instruments with 62% of African countries using the guarantees 
as a leveraging instrument with SSA applying this instrument to reported 73% of their projects. 
This is in contrast with the results of the BFT (2018) who argued that SSA are more the 
recipients of grants than guarantees. Further results from Benn et al. (2017) showed that: 
• Almost half of the private funds mobilised came from higher- income countries, 
implying limited investments received from local or domestic investors. 
• Almost two-thirds of the total amount mobilised resulted from the interventions from 
MDBs and the DFIs. 
• The energy sector was the second highest recipient of funds mobilised after the banking 
sector with the ICT and water and sanitation sector receiving only 2% of the funds 
mobilised. 
While the study shows great mobilisation effects in crowding-in the private sector through 
blended finance, it does recommend that a common understanding is required regarding 
blended finance and what the mobilisation effect really means for the different role players. 
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Furthermore, there is a need for more transparency around transaction information to develop 
more evidence-based research regarding the impact of blended finance. 
Aligned to the positive results of MDBs and DFIs’ role in mobilising private sector investments 
into infrastructure projects, Gurara, Presbitero and Sarmiento (2018) focused their research on 
the role of MDBs regarding syndicated loan deals and loan pricing. By collecting data from 23 
000 syndicated loans to emerging and developing countries from the dialogic loan analytic s 
database targeting the period of 1994–2015, the authors found that the involvement of MDBs 
could translate into lower spreads because of the mitigating borrower credit risk of the MDBs. 
That is, MDBs is critical in the de-risking component of projects in high-risk countries and due 
to these risk mitigation measures, has a high potential to crowd-in private investments into 
emerging and developing countries. It is thus assumed that there should be a positive 
relationship between the MDB/DFI and the participation of private sector investments into 
infrastructure projects in Africa. Broccolini et al. (2018) similarly focused on whether 
multilateral lending do mobilise private capital flows. Also referencing the dialogic database 
with tranches of syndicated loans from 1993 to 2017, Broccolini et al. (2018) targeted private 
borrowers with at least one foreign bank involved using a country-sector fixed-effects model. 
They concur with Gurara et al. (2018:12) that “MDB support to a country-sector significantly 
increases the number of syndicated loans, the total size of flows, the number of [private] 
partners brought in and the average maturity of loans”. 
Through the Redesigning Development Finance Initiative, the OECD and the WEF 
commissioned a survey of existing blended finance facilities and funds, including those that 
are currently managing and committed capital from private capital sources and development 
funders (OECD & WEF, 2016:4). The survey focused on capital that was disbursed to 
emerging and frontier markets6 through the funds and the facilities they surveyed. A cross-
section of 102 existing blended finance investment vehicles were surveyed with 74 classified 
as eligible for the survey (OECD & WEF, 2016). Qualitative interviews were conducted with 
selected funds and facilities. Development and philanthropic respondents included mostly 
multilateral and bilateral institutions from European and American-based organisations and 21 
private funds was included in the survey. 
                                                 
6 According to the WEF/OECD (2016:26) document, ““Emerging” and “frontier” markets refer to countries included in the 
OECD-DAC list of Official Develpoment Assistance (ODA) recipients.” They have however included the countries where 
funds deployed capital to emerging markets which was listed outside the OECD-DAC list. 
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The survey results indicated that blended finance could deliver increased capital flows, 
financial returns for investors and the different investment vehicles, and development impact 
for developing countries (OECD & WEF, 2016). Capital attributed to SSA countries from the 
74 funds and facilities totalled to $5.7bn of which 22% of the total capital attributed providing 
funds to SSA. 
While the study provides an indication of the capital leverage from the private sector, it is not 
comprehensive enough to provide a significant overview of the scope of the blended finance 
approaches within SSA. Furthermore, the respondents in the survey was limited to the networks 
of the WEF and only included the responses from selected bilateral, multilateral, and 21 fund 
managers. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands were surveyed for their 
ODA and FDI contributions toward emerging and frontier markets, the study could not 
interview or survey the recipients of these funds and their needs, such as the governments of 
the SSA region. 
The UNCDF (2018) used a mix of desktop research, case studies, and informal qualitat ive 
interviews to explore the potential use of a blended finance approach in financing projects in 
LDCs. More than 60% of the African countries qualify as LDCs. While integrating their data 
analysis with that of the study conducted by Benn et al. (2017), the noteworthy results from 
the UNCDF study comes from the five case studies (four from Africa) selected, includ ing 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Myanmar. 
The UNCDF (2018) authors report that two of the studies that were focused on infrastructure 
in Rwanda and Mali would have remained unbankable projects if it was not for the extensive 
project development support these countries received individually from the MDB and 
international institutions such as the AfDB and the Private Infrastructure Development Group 
providing technical assistance, grants, and loans. Some of the key overall challenges 
highlighted in these countries for the private sector to participate from the get-go include the 
lack of PPP regulations and the affordability of user tariffs for basic infrastructure such as water 
and electricity. 
Jandhyala (2016) examined whether MDBs in private infrastructure projects lowers the risk of 
projects and, in turn, increase the benefits of private participation in these projects. Jandhyala 
(2016) selected a sample of 2 117 infrastructure projects with private investments initia ted 
between 1995 and 2009 in 45 developing countries from the World Bank PPI database. Using 
a logit model and a propensity score matching technique in robustness tests, Jandhyala (2016) 
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highlights that projects supported by governments are more likely to be distressed and riskier 
for private sector participation. Projects with MDB support, however, has a lower likelihood 
to be distressed with the private sector or firms more likely to benefit from MDBs’ participat ion 
in these projects. According to Jandhyala (2016), MDBs are more likely to attract private sector 
participation in infrastructure projects, especially in countries with weak institutiona l 
development, while MDBs participation in countries with stronger institutional development 
prove to have the opposite effect. This suggest that where a country’s governance and 
regulatory systems are in place for private sector to invest, MDBs’ role is weakened and the 
private sector has more confidence to invest in those countries. 
Ratha (2005) reviewed the trends of the subsidiary World Bank’s IDA and IBRD lending 
commitments and how it correlates with debt service payments and a borrowing country’s level 
of international reserves. By conducting an econometric analysis of cross-country and time-
series data for the period of 1980–2000, Ratha (2005) suggests that countries seem to demand 
more World Bank lending (IDA/IBRD) when their international reserves decline, and their 
debt service payment increases. Focusing specifically on the results of IDA, Ratha (2005) 
reports that IDA loans to countries tend to take up a much larger share of borrowing countries’ 
GDPs, with those countries having limited access to private capital flows. Ratha (2005:418) 
found that IDA lending commitments tend to be negatively related to the level of internationa l 
reserves and positively related to debt service payments. In other words, this study implies that 
IDA concessional lending does not allow for the mobilisation of private sector investments but 
is more provided to countries due to their chronic inability to access private capital markets 
(Ratha, 2005). Dasgupta and Ratha (2000), through a country-level panel data analysis for 62 
selected IDA countries between 1974 and 1997, found that official IDA flows have a strong 
positive relationship towards SSA, and a lesser relationship or focus on North Africa. It is 
expected for this research that IDA and blended concessional funding provided by the IDA will 
have a negative relationship in mobilising private sector participation in investing in 
infrastructure projects in Africa.  
2.10 Summary 
This chapter highlighted Africa’s massive socio-economic challenges and the need for proper 
infrastructure development. The literature suggests that limited available funding are curbing 
most African countries to drive economic growth and negatively affects Africa’s goal to 
achieve the 2030 SDGs. 
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The conceptual framework presented in this chapter highlighted the complexity behind the 
conceptual understanding of blended finance, the role players involved, and how blended 
finance can be structured to fund Africa’s infrastructure. The literature review exposed a gap 
in the common understanding regarding blended finance and further suggests exploring what 
the mobilisation effect or crowding in of the private sector really means for the different role 
players.  The researcher adopted the OECD’s definition as a working definition for this 
research, while noting the limited understanding public sector officials have of blended finance 










This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology that was followed to conduct 
this study. This chapter first provides an outline of the mixed research design and approach, 
second, focuses on the sampling and data sources selected, and concluding with the quantitat ive 
and qualitative analytical frameworks. 
3.2 Research design and approach 
This study follows a mix method research approach using both quantitative and qualitat ive 
research methodologies and analysis. Dewasiri, Weerakoon and Azeez (2018:2) reasoned that 
by applying two different methodologies in a research process allows for greater 
generalisability, validity, and completeness and addresses the inconsistent results that could 
sometimes arise by only following either a quantitative or a qualitative approach. Quantitat ive 
results, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), could lack the detailed understand ing 
of what the effect sizes or statistical tests means, while the qualitative data could assist in 
building the argument and depth that the study need. By combining the usual explorations of, 
for example, words and narratives (the qualitative components) with the numerical data from 
larger surveys and secondary data (the quantitative component) on a similar issue, the research 
could be more generalised towards future examinations and studies (Hesse-Biber, 2010). 
Hesse-Biber (2010) argue that a mixed research approach could specifically be used for 
triangulation, which involves using several research methods to examine the same research 
question or research problem and thus, applying this method to enhance the credibility of the 
research study under review. The reasoning for using a mixed research approach for exploring 
this topic of blended finance for infrastructure investments in Africa could be motivated as 
follow: 
1. There are inconsistencies in the different quantitative methodological approaches 
followed in the few blended finance studies reported. Various self-administered surveys 
were conducted targeting different private sector institutions, MDBs, donors, or 
facilities (Basile & Dutra, 2019; DFI Working Group, 2018) The studies, however, lack 
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the detailed methodological approaches that could be replicated to other regions and 
tend to survey only the availability of members of large institutions of the WEF, EU, 
MDBs, or the OECD. 
2. There is limited research on blended finance, to the best of the researchers’ knowledge, 
that specifically targets the African continent. Case studies on using and understand ing 
blended finance for specific sectors were conducted in, for example, Uganda and 
Senegal (Kasirye & Lakal, 2019; Sene, 2019) and Tanzania7. Other research explored 
the scope of blended finance in Africa compared to other regions or continents based 
on their database of blended finance (Convergence, 2018, 2019). In other words, the 
scope of blended finance investments into the infrastructure sector, specifically focused 
on Africa, has not received the special attention it deserves. 
3. There is limited to no input from the government officials working in this field. To date, 
much of the research focused on the needs of the private sector with no or limited input 
received from the public sectors, and, more specifically, the government public officia ls 
who operate in the infrastructure space in Africa. Research studies focused on donor 
countries and the role of the MDBs related to blended finance but did not explore the 
government officials in Africa and members of public institutions such as a 
NEPAD/AUDA, Regional Economic communities in Africa and the African Union’s 
understanding of this phenomenon called blended finance. It was only recently through 
the work of the OECD & UNCDF (2019) that the principle of country ownership and 
blended finance was raised. 
Considering the motivations above for this research, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) 
suggests that a mixed method approach should rely on a variety of viewpoints and core 
characteristics that combines philosophical assumptions, mixed methods, and a specific 
research design orientation. Creswell and Plano Clark (2011:5) highlight the following key 
components for mixed research methods the researcher should follow: 
• Based on the research questions, the researcher should rigorously collect both 
quantitative and qualitative data that address the research questions. 
                                                 
7 Kathleen Charles presented a case study on the Use of Blended Finance Mechanisms in the Agriculture 
Infrastructure Sector in Tanzania  at a conference on Blended Finance in Geneva. The published document was 
not available at the time of completion of this research  
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• The researcher should be able to either mix two forms of data concurrently by 
embedding one with the other, sequentially by building one on the other, or 
concurrently merging the two forms of data. 
• The researcher should be able to prioritise one method over the other method or 
provide equal weight to both, depending on the research needs. 
• These procedures should be applied in either a single study or in a programme of 
study with multiple phases. 
• Procedures should be combined into specific research designs to direct the plan for 
conducting the study. 
For this study, the convergent parallel design (CPD) mixed research method, as defined and 
interpreted by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), was employed, which requires the researcher 
to follow concurrently the quantitative and qualitative processes during the design phase of the 
research while collecting and analysing the data for both the quantitative and qualitat ive 
approaches. Figure 3.1 provides a schematic overview of the CPD, identifying the steps to 
follow. 
Figure 3.1: Prototype of the CPD 
Source: Creswell & Plano Clark (2011:69) 
 
This design format, according to Morse (1991:122), aims “to obtain different but 
complementary data on the same topic” (cited in Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011:77). Mayoh 
and Onwuegbuzi (2015:100) refer to this approach as “phenomenology + quantitat ive 
approach”. Some critics argue that it is difficult to run these approaches concurrently for cross-
validation, as qualitative studies and that of phenomenological work, in general, is the 
exploration of the nature of human experience (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzi, 2015). Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2011) argue that while unequal sample sizes, merging the two different datasets, 
and finding discrepancies in both the qualitative and quantitative findings could create further 
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challenges in implementing it, using this research design could be beneficial for the research 
process. The sample sizes and data sources will be discussed further in the next section. 
Nevertheless, in this study, the quantitative data is exploring whether government and 
MDB/DFIs support attract private sector investments into infrastructure projects in Africa, 
while the qualitative component examines the public officials’ understanding of blended 
finance to mobilise private sector investments into Africa. 
For the implementation process of this research design, the Figure 3.2 outlines the basic 
procedures that were applied for this research, summarising the steps that were followed in 
implementing the CPD. 
Figure 3.2: Implementation Flowchart of the CPD Approach Adapted for this Research 
Study 
Source: Adapted from Creswell & Plano Clark (2011:79)
 
 
3.3 Sample and data sources 
As mentioned before, this study uses three independent sources of data. These data sources 
include secondary quantitative databases that is publicly available from the World Bank, while 
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a few respondents will be selected to be interviewed for this study to provide the government 
or public sector’s perspective on blended finance and its potential for Africa. Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2011) argue that when applying a CPD approach, the best option is for the two 
samples to have different sizes with the quantitative sample being much larger than the 
qualitative sample. They postulate that this approach “helps the researcher obtain an in-depth 
qualitative exploration and a rigorous quantitative examination of the topic” being examined 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011:183). This argument addresses one of the challenges raised 
earlier regarding the unequal sampling sizes of the population under investigation. These 
approaches will be outlined in more detail below. 
3.3.1 Quantitative sampling and data sources 
The main secondary data source used for this study is the World Bank’s Private Participat ion 
in Infrastructure (WB PPI) database. The WB PPI database records public infrastructure 
projects that reached financial closure in low- and middle- income countries as classified by the 
World Bank (version 2010) where there are contractual arrangements and the private sector is 
assuming operating risk8. This is complimented by using the World Bank’s International Debt 
Statistics (WB IDS) database and the World Bank’s database on the Sustainable Development 
Goals (WB SDGs). The unit of analysis was restricted to the economic infrastructure-specific 
deals in the ICT, energy, transport, and water and sewerage sectors, which reached financ ia l 
closure between 1994 and 2017 in specifically, North-Africa and the SSA regions. The list of 
the participating 49 countries, the income level of the different countries, as defined by the 
World Development Indicators report (2017), and the number of projects listed are captured in 
Annexure B. All African countries where the private sector participated in investing into 
infrastructure as per the information available in the WB PPI database were included in the 
study. Countries that were not listed in the WB PPI database include Burundi, Eritrea, Guinea-
Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, and Libya. 
Six hundred and forty-six project deals were listed as part of the final analysis. The top five 
countries in which most of the projects reached financial closure include South Africa (91), 
Nigeria (53), Egypt (53), Uganda (35), and Tanzania (32). The focus for this study, however, 
was not so much on the number of projects listed, but on whether blended finance do attract 
more private sector participation into the infrastructure projects in Africa. In this instance, as 
it is difficult to confirm that blended finance was applicable in each project, it was assumed 
                                                 
8 See https://ppi.worldbank.org/methodology/ppi -methodology  
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that once one of the following criteria was met, some form of a blended finance structure was 
employed to either support or crowd-in the private sector: 
1. The participation of an MDB or DFI in a project attracting/supporting the private sector 
to invest in the infrastructure deal; 
2. The presence of concessional financing in a country indicates the potential crowd-in of 
private sector investment into that country for development projects; 
3. IDA and blended finance countries of IDA are used as a tool to attract private sector 
participation investment into the infrastructure project; or 
4. Government support, whether direct or indirect, is included to provide some sort of 
guarantee or agreement for the project to go ahead. 
Countries are specifically listed as per income level to provide an upfront indication of where 
the private sector feels most comfortable to invest their money. The preliminary results show 
that 26% of the private sector investments are allocated to upper middle-income countries, with 
South Africa the one outlier being the recipient of 91 private sector projects in this period. 
Further analysis is still required to understand where the investments are going, considering 
the fear from many researchers that the LDCs will lose out from private investors when 
following a blended finance approach. A limitation to this study is that the detailed country-
risks per the rating agencies associated with investing in these projects or countries are not 
covered in this study. 
3.3.2 Qualitative sampling and data collection 
As previously mentioned, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) argue that in the CPD, both the 
qualitative and quantitative data must be collected concurrently, the information analysed 
separately, and eventually, the two databases can be merged in the interpretation process. For 
this research, data were collected from two independent sources, namely the World Bank 
databases for the quantitative data and in-depth interviews for the qualitative data. To identify 
people willing to be interviewed, the researcher employed a purposeful sampling technique. 
The researcher focused on those public sector officials with an understanding of investing in 
infrastructure in Africa and the role of the funding support provided by MDBs and DFIs in this 
space in Africa aligned to the CPD principle where the same questions or variables were 
explored. A snowball sampling technique, which is described as a non-probability sampling 
method where those people interviewed are requested to suggest or identify additional availab le 
individuals to interview for this subject matter, were applied (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). It 
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should be repeated that the qualitative sample should be much smaller than the quantitat ive 
sample to ensure in-depth qualitative exploration (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In addition, 
Mason (2002) emphasised that it is not the number of respondents interviewed for the research, 
but whether the researcher has collected enough information to be convinced that saturation 
was achieved and no new knowledge can be derived from the interview process.  
The qualitative data collection approach will follow a semi-structured interview process. Morse 
(1994) argues that through a semi-structured interview process, the researcher can start with 
general enquiries around the specific topic of exploration but can follow this up with more 
specific themes and patterns in subsequent interviews. Furthermore, this form of interviewing 
is a more flexible and an open research tool and could provide different perspectives that are 
not always known. Furthermore, it could provide disadvantaged groups the opportunity to air 
and publicise their views on the subject matter (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall,  
1994). Interviews will be conducted either using face-to-face or telephonic interviews, 
depending on the availability of the respondent. Indicative start-up questions for the interview 
is captured in the interview schedule in Annexure C. 
3.4 Analytical framework – Quantitative analysis 
The next section will provide more detail regarding the analytical framework that will be used 
in this study. The unit of analysis for the study is infrastructure investments in countries. 
3.4.1 Regression model for exploring blended finance through WB databases 
To examine the scope of private sector investments into infrastructure projects in Africa, the 
statistical computerised system, Stata version 15.0 (Stata Corporation, College Station, USA) 
was used. Descriptive statistics and a multiple linear regression model were employed for the 
purposes of analysis. The purpose of a multiple regression analysis, according to Jeon (2015) 
is to (1) to determine whether the independent variable(s) influence the dependent variable, 
and (2) to determine if the change in one unit of the independent variable could predict the 
amount of change in the dependent variable. Multiple regression analysis was used as a 
powerful statistical tool to model the relationship between a set of independent variables and 
the dependent variable (Jeon, 2015). 
The goal of the multiple regression analysis in this study is to determine the relationship of the 
various independent variables (MDB Support, concession, IDA, Government Support, Type of 
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Private sector, project status, primary sector, type of proposal, FDI, Income and Geographica l 
region) on the dependent variable (Private participation investing in infrastructure). 
Notably, the relationships identified among variables in the analysis does not imply that those 
relationships are causal as well. Assumptions regarding multiple regression analysis must be 
met, including testing for multicollinearity, hetero- and homoscedasticity, and normality. For 
example, regarding multicollinearity, Gujarati (2003:359) states that “[i]f R2 is high, say, in 
excess of 0.8, the F test in most cases will reject the hypothesis that the partial slope coefficients 
are simultaneously equal to zero, but the individual t tests will show that none or very few of 
the partial slope coefficients are statistically different from zero”. On the other hand, if there is 
a high pair-wise correlation coefficient between two regressors more than 0.80, then 
multicollinearity could be regarded as a serious challenge (Gujarati, 2003: 359). Assuming all 
these assumptions have been met, the factors influencing or have a relationship with private 
participation investing in infrastructure projects will be analysed in alignment with the 
objective of this research. The advantage thus of using multiple regression analysis for the 
purpose of this study is to examine, to some extent, the influence a variety of independent 
variables will have on the dependent variable, which in this case is the private participat ion 
investing infrastructure. 
The regression model for private participation investing in infrastructure (PRIV) include the 
following predicted relationship variables: MDB support, dummy variable for where 
MDBs/DFIs are linked to a project (𝛽0), Concession (CONCES), IDA_status (IDA), 
Government support (GOVSUP), type of private sector participation (TOPRIV), project status 
(PSTATUS), primary sector (PRIMSEC), type of proposal (PROPTYPE), FDI, income 
(INCGROUP), and geographical regions (GEOGR). The sample regression model as an 
estimate of the database, and can be drafted as: 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑀𝐷𝐵𝑆𝑖+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖+ 𝛽3𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖 +𝛽5𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖 +𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖+ 𝛽11𝐺𝐸𝑂𝐺𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
The definition of each variable is captured in Table 3.1 on the next page. 
3.4.2 Measurement & description of independent variables 
This section of the research aims to motivate the chosen variables selected and its potential 
impact on the findings of this research study. Only a selected group of variables are discussed 
42 
 
in this section which is expected to have an impact on the results of this study. Reference will 
be made to previous studies in this field. 
3.4.2.1 Multilateral, bilateral and DFI support (MDBS) 
Multilateral and bilateral support to advance infrastructure projects in developing countries 
through blended finance is identified throughout this research as an integral component for 
crowding-in private sector investments into these sectors. Jandhyala (2016), for example, found 
that there is a lower likelihood for an infrastructure project to be distressed9 when there are 
MDB participation associated with the project. Various studies reported on the positive effect 
of MDB support on crowding- in private sector investments into infrastructure projects by, for 
example, funding, securities, and guarantee instruments, and thus, also reducing the risk of 
relevant projects (Buiter & Fries, 2002; Calitz & Fourie, 2010; Byoun, Kim & Yoo, 2013; 
Mawdsley, 2015; Bayliss & Waeyenberg, 2018; Convergence, 2018; DFI Working Group, 
2018; Convergence, 2019). Convergence (2018) reports that 47% of MDB and DFI institutions 
combined are active blended finance investors, and notes that 42% of blended finance deals 
are targeted at SSA. 
Several studies are available that delve into the role of DFIs into infrastructure projects to 
mobilise private sector investments, but only a few of them focus specifically on Africa (ICA, 
2018). 
Table 3.1: Definitions of Variables 
ABBREVIATION VARIABLES DESCRIPTION SOURCES 
OF DATA 
Dependent variable 
PRIV Private Sector 
Mobilisation 




Core Independent Variables   
MDBS Multi- or bilateral 
support- include DFIs 
Dummy Variable  WB PPI 
GOVSUP Direct Support 
Indirect Support 
Government granting the 
contract 
Dummy Variable WB PPI 
    
CONCES Concessional debt Concessional debt (% of total 
external debt)  
WB IDS 
IDA IDA Grants 
NON-IDA 
IDA support depends on a 
country’s relative poverty, 
WB PPI 
                                                 
9 Jandhyala (2016) postulates that a project is in distress when it is abandoned or cancelled, and the original 
contracted services are no longer provided by the private sector. 
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ABBREVIATION VARIABLES DESCRIPTION SOURCES 
OF DATA 
Blend Countries defined as GNI per capita 
below an established threshold 
and updated annually 
($1,145 in fiscal year 2019); 
while blend countries IDA-




Moderators – private sector variables 
PRIMSEC Primary Sectors (Energy, 
Transport, Water 7 
Sewerage, ICT) 
Only primary sectors are 






Management & lease 
contracts 
Four categories in which 
private sector infrastructure 
projects are classified. 
WB PPI 
PSTATUS Projects that have been 
active, cancelled, 
concluded or distress 
Only the last update of status 
of project is recorded 
WB PPI 
PROPTYPE Unsolicited bids from 
private sector to 
governments 
Unsolicited bids are where the 
private sector leads the process 
of identifying and developing 
new projects for governments 
WB PPI 
Macro-Economic Factors – Control variables 
FDI Foreign Direct 
Investments 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) WB SDG 
INCGROUP Income status of the 
country 
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
WB SDG 
GEOGR Geographical regions Projects awarded in low- and 
middle-income countries, as 
classified by the World Bank 
July 2010 categories. Upper-




3.4.2.2 Government support (GOVSUP) 
The WB PPI updated their variable definitions and split government support to direct and 
indirect government support. It is defined as, “direct government support is further split into 
capital subsidy, revenue subsidy, and in-kind support. Indirect government support has all of 
the various guarantees, as well as the new subcategory tax deduction/government credit”. The 
WB PPI database changed their data to include specifically infrastructure projects that 
specifically involves government or public sector projects to drive private sector investments. 
                                                 
10 See http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries  
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It is widely reported that governments cannot pay for the public infrastructure projects they so 
desperately need to ensure economic growth, especially in Africa. To increase development 
finance and mobilise private sector finance into Africa, governments should create the 
necessary enabling environment. This study draws on the government support as one variable 
to explore whether government support in infrastructure projects do have a positive relationship 
with private sector institutions to invest their money into infrastructure projects in Africa. 
3.4.2.3 IDA/NON-IDA or Blend (IDA) 
The IDA of the World Bank is a key blended finance instrument that lends money on 
concessional terms to countries at risk of debt distress and provides grants to programmes that 
will boost economic growth in a specific country11. The IDA provides low to zero interest rates 
on their loans, has a tenure that can stretch over 30 years, and a grace period of a maximum of 
10 years; yet, private infrastructure investment in IDA/blend vs. non-IDA countries remains 
scarce in the poorest of countries. IDA/Blend investments remain below USD50 billion 
annually; yet, it peaked at almost USD200 billion in 2012 in non-IDA countries (Humphrey, 
2018). Forty-one of Africa’s 54 countries has either IDA or blended status. Countries with 
blended status, such as Nigeria, are eligible based on per capita income levels, and creditworthy 
for IBRD borrowing12. The IDA/Blend of the World Bank provides an additional instrument 
into which a country could tap to mobilise additional private sector funding for investments in 
infrastructure projects on the continent. Aligned to the study conducted by Dasgupta and Ratha 
(2000), it is expected that the IDA instruments will overall have a negative relationship with 
private sector participations in investing in infrastructure projects in Africa. 
3.4.2.4 Primary Sector (PRIMSEC) 
The primary sectors of investigation will be focused on ICT, water and sewerage, and energy 
and transport. All sub-sectors are included as per the WB PPI database definition. The new 
WB PPI tracks not only private sector projects for ICT, but tracks the ICT backbone, usually 
covered by the public sector. Convergence (2018, 2019) showed that the energy sector has 
dominated the blended finance space. Not only are infrastructure investments in countries the 
unit of analysis for this study, but the objective is also to explore in which sectors the private 
sector are mostly investing in Africa with a key focus on the economic sectors. It is assumed 
                                                 
11 See http://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-is-ida  
12 See http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries  
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that the energy sector will dominate the private sector investments in Africa, considering the 
Convergence results. 
3.4.2.5 Types of private participation (TOPRIV) 
The WB PPI classified private sector participation into four main categories. These include: 
• Management and lease contracts – While investment decisions remain with the state or 
government, the private owner could lease or manage the asset for a fixed term as per 
the contractual agreement (e.g. Toll road in a PPP project). 
• Greenfield projects – A new facility or project is erected that is build and operated for 
a specified period by either the private sector only or through a private-public sector 
venture. In this case, the private sector is taking up the operational and financial risk 
and makes its revenue throughout the life of the project in its care. 
• Brownfield projects – Similar to greenfield projects with the only difference being that 
the asset already exists, the private sector undertakes the operations and capital 
investment. 
• Divestitures – An equity stake is bought by the private sector into a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) where the private operator receives full responsibilities for 
investments, operations, and maintenance. This could be a full government transfer of 
100% of the equity of the SOE to the private sector or it could be on a partial 
arrangement. 
3.4.2.6 Project status (PSTATUS) 
The project status identifies whether a project is active, cancelled, distressed, or concluded. All 
status items are included in the study to provide an overall view of the status of the projects. A 
project, according to the WB PPI, is distressed if either the private entity to the government 
requested for the contract to be terminated or the project is in international arbitration. Studies 
that focused on the statuses of projects in Africa still argue that there are limited bankable 
projects on the continent. The intention is to show that the private sector is investing in 
infrastructure projects on the continent and the reasons why these private entities are invest ing 
in these projects. 
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3.4.2.7 Concessional debt (CONCES) 
Providing concessional financing or funding, weather in the form of grants, debt, or equity, is 
one of the key instruments used by philanthropist, MDBs, and donors to mobilise additiona l 
finance into infrastructure projects or to finance social programmes that would otherwise not 
receive the necessary funding. The DFI Working Group (2018:4) showed through the results 
of a self-reported pilot survey during the period of 2014–2016 that the DFI’s “annual use of 
concessional finance from donors by the DFIs for private sector projects in developin g 
countries [reached] … at least USD700 million, with DFIs contributing at least an additiona l 
USD1.7 billion to the projects from their own funds and supporting total project costs between 
5 and 17 times the concessional amount”. That is a contribution of approximately USD5 billion 
annually (DFI Working Group, 2018). Convergence (2018) argued that more than 40% of the 
blended finance transactions in their database used concessional funding, which was typically 
provided by philanthropic and public institutions where for every USD1 of concessional funds, 
approximately USD4 of private sector finance were mobilised. No concessional debt, a 
percentage of total external debt, was reported for South Africa, with missing data reported for 
Namibia and Seychelles. Considering the limited information available from the DFI Working 
Group (2018) and Convergence (2018), there should be a positive relationship between 
concessional debt in a country with a higher percentage of private sector investments into 
African Countries, with South Africa being the outlier. 
3.4.3 Estimation technique 
The World Bank PPI database can be downloaded as a panel data set using Stata for further 
empirical analysis of its 6400 infrastructure projects across 137 low- and middle- income 
countries from 1994 to 2019 (or to date)13. However, instead of using panel data analysis, a 
cross-sectional study was conducted, employing an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
technique to estimate the multiple linear regression model. This required an upfront 
investigation of all potential related assumptions regarding the OLS estimation. 
Shanahan (2012) argues that the objective with cross-sectional designs and analysis is to access 
a representation of the population of interest at one given point in time. Data, for this study, 
were selected at one point in time from the World Bank PPI database. The intent of this study 
is to explore private sector’s relationship with blended finance instruments, such as receiving 
                                                 
13 https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppidata   
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MDB support, when investing in infrastructure projects in African countries. The objective is 
not to explore the changes in the private sector’s behaviour when investing in these countries, 
but to understand whether at the time of investment was there any positive or negative 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables under consideration.  
Reflecting on the discussion of cross-sectional analysis as presented by Salkind’s (2012), the 
following motivations can be provided for the selection of cross-sectional analysis for this 
study: 
• This study is examining African countries who were the recipients of different 
observations or number of infrastructure investment projects per annum over the period 
selected. 
• The data is from a group of countries with varied characteristics from, for example, 
income status, FDI flows etc., 
• The data does not provide any information on the change over time with the impact of 
blended finance instruments. 
3.5 Analytical framework – Qualitative analysis 
In a mixed research approach both the quantitative data and the qualitative data tend to be 
analysed separately. The qualitative data in the form of in-depth semi-structured interviews 
will be subjected to a thematic analysis approach. According to Guest, MacQueen and Namey 
(2014), thematic analysis requires an in-depth focus by the researcher on describing and 
identifying both the implicit and explicit ideas and the key patterns that is presented by the data 
that leads to the specific themes. The basis of thematic analysis is in the identification of 
recurring messages where the process requires breaking the narrative data into categories, 
which is followed by observing for patterns across all the data received and comparing it across 
different settings (Costa, Breda, Pinho, Bakas & Durão, 2016). For this study, the researcher 
recorded and transcribed all interviews. Notes were taken throughout the interview process as 
a reminder of the key points where the respondent were passionate about the subject discussed 
and or emphasised. 
The transcribing of all the interviews were done in Microsoft Word and later exported to 
NVIVO 12 Pro, a Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package 
that assist the researcher in the analysis process of the qualitative data. Due to the large size of 
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qualitative data usually collected, researchers (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Patton, 2002;) 
encourage using qualitative software packages for qualitative analysis. 
Coding of the data is usually applied to break the data down during the process towards 
identifying key themes emerging from the data. Strauss and Corbin (1998) identifies three 
progressive coding techniques that were applied in this research study. These include open 
coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the mentioned 
coding techniques. 
Table 3.2: Coding Techniques 
Source: Strauss & Corbin (1998), extracted from Costa et.al., (2016:38) 
Type 
Open coding Refers to the process of generating initial concepts from data. Concepts 
are identified and their properties and dimensions discovered. 
Axial coding Through axial coding, categories and their related subcategories and 
concepts were refined to form more precise explanations 
Selective coding Selective coding is used to integrate and refine categories to form a 
larger theoretical scheme 
 
In alignment with the convergent design approach, the qualitative themes will be discussed 
with the quantitative results.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology that was followed to conduct 
this study. A detailed overview of the mixed research design and approach was provided with 
a focus on the convergent parallel design (CPD) mixed research method. This method requires 
the researcher to follow concurrently the quantitative and qualitative processes during the 
design phase of the research while collecting and analysing the data for both the quantitat ive 
and qualitative approaches. The chapter is concluded with the quantitative and qualitat ive 
analytical frameworks to be employed. 
 





DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the quantitative and qualitative results of the mixed research 
methodology applied to explore blended finance for infrastructure projects in Africa. Section 
1 focuses on the quantitative results and Section 2 on the qualitative results. 
4.2 Quantitative results 
4.2.1 Descriptive results 
Table 4.1 summarises the descriptive statistical results for all the variables as defined in 
Chapter 3. The average for all the countries is calculated based on the number of projects in 
which private sector participated for the period of 1994 to 2017 across Africa. Around 644 
observations were detected for most of the variables with only 600 private sector participat ion 
(PRIV) in infrastructure investment observations reported in Africa during this period. It is 
further shown that 624 of the 644 observations held concessional (CONCES) debt as a 
percentage of the GDP for the period the project was captured. FDI was evident in 631 
observations. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Stats Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
PRIV 0.887 1.000 0.199 0.050 1.000 600 
MDBS 0.334 0.000 0.472 0.000 1.000 644 
CONCES 0.445 0.423 0.281 0.000 0.935 624 
IDA 0.747 1.000 0.676 0.000 2.000 644 
GOVSUP 0.197 0.000 0.398 0.000 1.000 644 
TOPRIV 1.686 1.000 1.018 1.000 4.000 644 
PSTATUS 1.253 1.000 0.676 1.000 4.000 644 
PRIMSEC 2.398 2.000 1.018 1.000 4.000 644 
PROPTYPE 0.711 1.000 0.454 0.000 1.000 644 
FDI 0.041 0.025 0.126 −0.058 1.597 631 
INCGROUP 1.992 2.000 0.743 1.000 3.000 644 
GEOGR 3.401 4.000 1.312 1.000 5.000 644 
Note: PRIV = Private sector participation; MDBS = Include Multilateral or bilateral support; CONCES = Concessional 
debt as % of total external debt; IDA = International Development Association support; GOVSUP = Direct or indirect 
support; TOPRIV = Classification of private sector infrastructure projects; PSTATUS = Active, Cancelled, Concluded or 
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Distress; PROPTYPE = Solicited or Unsolicited bid; FDI = Foreign Direct Investment net inflows as % of GDP;  
INCGROUP = Income status of country; GEOGR = Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Africa. 
 
Investment through private participation in infrastructure projects in the selected data is high 
with a mean of about 88.7%. In the 44 observations where there is no private sector 
participation, it can be inferred that the projects listed were most likely financed through 
public-public partnerships; that is through multilateral and or bilateral support and or 
government contribution or this information were missing or not reported on. 
MDB support to African countries is averaging as low as 33% compared to the participat ion 
of the private sector participation in infrastructure investments in these projects. 
Simultaneously, the direct and indirect support received from African governments (GOVSUP) 
towards these infrastructure projects is on average low with a mean of 0.2. The IDA support is 
averaged higher at a mean of 0.7. 
Most of the type of investments are leaning more towards investing into the brownfield projects 
at 1.68, while the median is showing that the most recurring investment projects tend to be 
greenfield projects. The energy sector is still dominating as the PRIMSEC for private sector 
participation on average, with most of these projects, according to the data, reported as 
unsolicited bids (PROPTYPE). The FDI net flows as a percentage of GDP per annum averaged 
around 4%. 
Most of the investments, according to the mean, is leading towards the northern and southern 
African regions. Most of the investments are more in lower middle-income countries with 
limited investments going to lower- and upper-income countries. 
4.2.2 Private sector investments: Region and income group analysis 
A deeper frequency analysis into the private sector participation into the specific geographica l 
and country income group analysis does not show much difference. 
Table 4.2: Region and Income Group Analysis 
Geographic regions PRIV   Income Grouping  PRIV 
Central Africa 0.7656   Lower-Income 0.8851 
Eastern Africa 0.9436   Lower-middle-income 0.8984 
Northern Africa 0.8551   Upper-middle- income 0.8687 
Southern Africa 0.8719       
Western Africa 0.9006       
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Central Africa, according to Table 4.1, is receiving the lowest investment from a private 
sponsor at around 76.5%, while the eastern African region is receiving the highest participat ion 
from private sector investors at 94.3%. The latter is contradicting, as the results of the mean as 
reported in the descriptive analysis showed more investments from private participation in 
infrastructure projects in the southern and northern African regions. 
The lower-middle- income countries are receiving slightly higher private sector participation at 
89.8% compared to the lower and upper middle-income countries, which is not far behind at 
89.8% and 86.8% respectively. 
4.2.3 Correlation results: Factors determining private sector participation 
The correlation matrix in Table 4.3 shows that MDBS has a negative correlation with private 
sector participation. Blended finance instruments to attract private sector participation such as 
using concessional debt (CONCES) and IDA support (IDA) through grants, low interest loans 
or technical assistance are also negatively correlated with private sector participation. 
Government support, whether direct or indirect, as well as FDI flows, show a positive but weak 
relationship to private sector participation. 
The correlation matrix is indicating a strong negative relationship between income and 
concessional debt as a percentage of GDP and income and IDA support. There is a high 
likelihood that the higher the income status of the country, the less concession it is receiving. 
Similarly, there is a high likelihood that an upper-middle- income country will receive much 
less IDA support than lower-income countries. 
The results of the correlation analysis do not show any evidence of multicollinearity, as per 




Table 4.3: Correlation matrix 
  PRIV MDBS CONCES IDA GOVSUP TOPRIV PSTATUS PRIMSEC PROPT~ FDI INCGR~ GEOGR 
PRIV 1            
MDBS −0.020 1           
  (0.634)            
CONCES −0.028 0.195 1          
  (0.501) (0.000)           
IDA −0.013 0.061 0.4217 1         
  (0.758) (0.125) (0.000)          
GOVSUP 0.061 0.179 −0.1634 −0.2476 1        
  (0.133) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
TOPRIV −0.104 −0.092 0.208 0.156 −0.208 1       
  (0.011) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
PSTATUS −0.006 −0.056 0.144 0.137 −0.157 0.258 1      
  (0.889) (0.158) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)       
PRIMSEC 0.120 −0.047 0.010 0.101 −0.086 0.245 −0.027 1     
  (0.003) (0.235) (0.810) (0.010) (0.029) (0.000) (0.499)      
PROPTYPE −0.170 −0.174 0.312 0.284 −0.433 0.282 0.219 0.188 1    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
FDI 0.040 −0.014 0.052 0.086 −0.028 0.044 −0.050 0.020 −0.047 1   
  (0.338) (0.724) (0.199) (0.031) (0.490) (0.270) (0.211) (0.623) (0.235)    
INCGROUP −0.031 −0.157 −0.772 −0.565 0.095 −0.079 −0.142 0.047 −0.214 −0.174 1  
  (0.456) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.044) (0.000) (0.231) (0.000) (0.000)   
GEOGR 0.027 0.000 −0.198 0.134 −0.065 0.057 −0.064 0.096 −0.030 0.121 0.117 1 
  (0.505) (0.993) (0.000) (0.001) (0.099) (0.149) (0.107) (0.015) (0.447) (0.002) (0.003)  
Note: PRIV=Private sector participation; MDBS=Include Multilateral or bilateral support; CONCES=Concessional debt as % of tot al external debt; IDA=International Development Association support; GOVSUP=Direct or 
indirect support; TOPRIV=Classification of private sector infrastructure projects; PSTATUS= Active, Cancelled, Concluded or Distress; PROPTYPE=Solicited or Unsolicited bid; FDI=Foreign Direct Investment net inflows  
as % of GDP; INCGROUP=Income status of country; GEOGR= Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Africa. Values in parentheses represent p-values.
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4.2.4 Regression results: Private sector participation investment in infrastructure 
The results of the multiple linear regression model on the effect of MDBS on private sector 
participation investment in infrastructure (PRIV) projects is presented in Table 4.4. The results of 
the multiple regression analysis are statistically significant (F (22.558) = 12.6, p = 0.000), indicat ing 
that the slope of the estimated linear regression model is not equal to zero. Stata results shows lower 
bound of the slope at −.071 and upper bound of the slope at .104. The regression model in Table 4.5 
proves to be highly significant at the 1% level with a p value of 0.000 and a low coefficient of 
determination (R2) value of 0.332. This indicates that the independent variables could only explain 
around 33% of the variation in the private sector participation investment into infrastructure projects 
(dependent variable). To determine the relationship of the independent variables identified regarding 
the PRIV dependent variable, a multiple linear regression analysis was used. 
The coefficient of MDBS has a negative relationship with private participation in infrastructure 
investment at the 1% significant level (Coef = 1.083; t = -3.34; p.=.000). This means that projects 
with MDB support are characterised by lower private sector participation in infrastructure 
investments. This result is in line with the result of Rodrick (1995) who found no significant 
association between past multilateral lending and current private flows. The outcome can further be 
linked to the study conducted by Ratha (2001) who found a negative relationship between private 
sector flows and multilateral loans in the short term. Dasgupta and Ratha (2000), through their 
investigation of the World Bank lending, showed a negative relationship with private sector flows.  
The results, however, could be contrasted with those of Broccolini et al. (2019), and Jandhyala 
(2016) who both argued that MDB support do attract private participation in infrastructure 
investment projects in different ways. Broccolini et al (2019) argued that MDB support increases 
the number of additional partners brought into the project and the number of syndicated loans. 
Jandhyala (2016) found support in her data for her hypothesis that an infrastructure project with 
private sector investment will be less distressed when there is an MDB involved in that specific 
project. While both the hypotheses’ might be somewhat different, both studies argue that MDBs, 
largely, through their instruments and expertise could crowd-in private sector participation in 






Table 4.4: Factors Influencing Private Investments in Infrastructure Projects 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Constant 1.083 0.064 16.99 0.000 
MDBS _Yes −0.055*** 0.016 −3.34 0.001 
CONCES -0.024 0.049 −0.5 0.620 
IDA (NON-IDA )     
IDA −0.281*** 0.049 −5.74 0.000 
Blended −0.250*** 0.050 −5.04 0.000 
GOVSUP_Yes −0.003 0.020 −0.14 0.886 
TOPRIV (GREENFIELD)     
Brownfield project −0.012 0.022 −0.55 0.582 
Management and lease contract −0.247*** 0.031 −8.05 0.000 
Divestiture 0.120*** 0.032 3.77 0.000 
PSTATUS (ACTIVE)     
Concluded 0.018 0.036 0.49 0.624 
Cancelled −0.038 0.031 −1.23 0.219 
Distressed 0.094** 0.044 2.1 0.036 
PRIMSEC (ICT)     
Energy 0.043* 0.026 1.66 0.098 
Water & Sewerage 0.003 0.039 0.07 0.947 
Transport 0.028 0.031 0.92 0.359 
PROPTYPE_Yes −0.056*** 0.020 −2.89 0.004 
FDI 0.030 0.061 0.5 0.618 
INCGROUP (Lower-Income)     
Lower-middle-income 0.012 0.023 0.54 0.589 
Upper-middle- income −0.225*** 0.047 −4.77 0.000 
GEOGR (Central Africa) 
Eastern Africa 0.185*** 0.034 5.4 0.000 
Northern Africa −0.135*** 0.047 −2.9 0.004 
Southern Africa 0.046 0.034 1.36 0.174 
Western Africa 0.143*** 0.032 4.53 0.000 
F(22, 558)  12.6   
Prob > F  0.000   
R-squared  0.332   
Adj. R-squared  0.3056   
Root MSE  0.16474   
Observations  581   
Note: PRIV=Private sector participation; MDBS = Include Multilateral or bilateral support; CONCES = Concessional debt as % of total external debt; 
IDA = International Development Association support; GOVSUP = Direct or indirect support; TOPRIV = Classification of private sector infrastructure 
projects; PSTATUS = Active, Cancelled, Concluded or Distress; PROPTYPE = Solicited or Unsolicited bid; FDI = Foreign Direct Investment net 
inflows as % of GDP; INCGROUP = Income status of country; GEOGR = Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Africa. ***, ** and * denotes 





The results also show that there is a significant negative relationship between private participat ion 
in infrastructure investment and IDA. Specifically, IDA countries are observed to have a lower 
likelihood of attracting private participation in infrastructure investment compared to non-IDA 
countries at the 1% significant level (Coef = −0.281; t = −5.74; p.=.000). Similarly, blended support, 
an additional IDA instrument, also indicated a significant relation with private participation in 
infrastructure investment (Coef = −0.250; t = −5.04; p =.000). This means that countries receiving 
IDA or blended support is characterised by receiving lower private sector participation in their 
projects. The results are contrasting to the research of Galiani, Knack, Xu and Zou (2016), who 
argued that when IDA is viewed as an instrument of aid, the investment rate in that country drops 
in that specific country following the reduction in aid. In other words, Galiani et al. is arguing that 
aid instruments, such as the IDA, is more likely to increase the investment rate of other sources, 
such as private capital flows, into those countries. This links to the income status of a country to 
receive private participation in infrastructure investments. Ratha (2005) argues that IDA support is 
more likely to be targeted where private sector investment is less likely to occur due to the inability 
of these countries to access the private capital markets. The results of this study are more likely to 
concur with the finding of Ratha (2005), as most of the countries in this sample has a lower-income 
status as per the UNCDF (2018) experiencing institutional and regulatory challenges. 
There is a high likelihood that an upper middle-income country will receive significantly less private 
sector participation with the coefficient of upper middle-income countries observed to have a 
negative relationship with PRIV at the 1% significant level (Coef = −0.225; t = −4.77; p =.000). The 
result reflects the correlation matrix in Table 4.3, which showed that the higher the income level of 
a country, the lower concessional and IDA support it will receive. The results of this study align 
with the results of the UNCDF (2018). It can be argued that middle-income countries are still the 
largest beneficiaries of private sector participation in infrastructure investment projects, which is 
also reflected in the negative relationship in the correlation matrix in Table 4.3; albeit not significant 
(UNCDF, 2018). The OECD/UNCDF (2019) found that of the total private sector funding mobilised 
by official development finance interventions between 2012 and 2017, only 6% went to LDCs, while 
over 70% was injected into middle- income countries. LDCs are on average still mobilising less 
private sector investments through blended finance deals compared to other developing countries 
(OECD/UNCDF, 2019). 
The coefficient of the project status of distressed projects is observed to have a positive relationship 
with private participation in infrastructure investment projects at the 10% significant level (Coef = 
0.094; t = 2.1; p = 0.036) compared to active projects in which the private sector is participating. 
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The results are in line with the that from Guarara et al. (2018) who showed that 5% of projects in 
the PPI database is either distressed or cancelled, and Jandhyala (2016) who found that 9% of the 
infrastructure projects in her sample could be classified as under distress. Jandhyala (2016), for 
example, found that projects supported by government are more likely to be under distress, which 
could be linked to the risks associated with these projects. Both Guarara et al. (2018) and Jandhyal 
(2016) found that projects were less distressed where there are MDB support involved in these 
projects. 
The results revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between eastern Africa (Coef 
= −0.185; t = 5.4; p =.000) and western Africa (Coef = 0.143; t = 4.53; p =.000). while northern 
Africa (Coef = −0.135; t = −2.9; p =.004). is observed to have a negative relationship with private 
sector participation at the 1% significance level. This means that as more projects are available for 
investments in the eastern and western African regions, the more likely it is that private sector 
participations in these regions will increase. This result concurs with the findings from both the 
AfDB (2018) and the ICA (2017) publications that indicated that investments into infrastructure 
tend to be higher in the eastern and western African regions. While private sector participation in 
the northern African regions indicate a negative relationship, characterised by lower private sector 
participation in this region, which is in contrast to the results from the AfDB (2018). Northern Africa 
has been the recipient of disbursements into its infrastructure of up to 20.7% of Africa’s total share 
by 2016 (AfDB, 2018), indicating increases of investments over the years observed. 
The results in Table 4.5 indicates a significant positive relationship between private sector 
participation investing in infrastructure and the energy sector (Coef = −0..043; t = 1.66; p =.098) at 
the 10% significance level in African countries. The results concur with other research that blended 
finance transactions have been dominating in the energy sector with 38% of blended finance 
transactions reported in the energy sectors in SSA between 2010 and 2018 alone (Convergence, 
2019). This, however, also means that the more the private sector participates in infrastructure 
investment projects in the energy sector, the lesser it participates in much more needed 
developmental infrastructure sectors such as water and sanitation, which shows a positive but not 
significant relationship with the private sector. 
The results further showed that there is a significant negative relationship with private participat ion 
in infrastructure investment and management and lease contracts. More specifically, management 
and lease contracts are observed to have a lower likelihood of having private sector participation in 
infrastructure investments compared to participation in greenfield projects (Coef = −0.247; t = 
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−8.05; p =.000). Simultaneously, the coefficient of the type of divestiture projects is observed to 
have a positive relationship at the 1% significance level compared to greenfield projects where the 
private sector is participating in infrastructure investments (Coef = 0.120; t = 3.77; p = 0.000). The 
results are in line with a recent study focusing on private sector participation in the energy 
infrastructure sector in Ghana, which found that the private sector is more likely to invest in 
greenfield projects through PPPs as opposed to management and leasing contracts (Owusu-Manu, 
Edwards, Kutin-Mensah, Kilby, Parn, Love, 2017). Berg and Shirley (1990), in their review of 
divestiture in developing countries, found few instances of leasing and management contracts of 
private participation and during this time, found a limited number of divestiture projects, specifica lly 
in developing countries. The one reason provided is because developing countries are not always 
keen to sell off state-owned entities to the private sector. 
Finally, the coefficient of the type of proposal (PROPTYPE) showed a negative significant 
relationship (Coef = −0.056; t = −2.89; p = 0.004). between solicited bids and private sector 
participation investment in infrastructure projects, highlighting that the private sector is not always 
keen to bid for government-published or initiated projects but would rather approach the public 
sector with a new project for development and skip the procurement and bidding process 
(unsolicited bids). The result is thus not surprising, as Yun, Jung, Han and Park (2012) confirm that 
various factors are influencing the success of a solicited projects. The private sector, however, are 
deterred from these types of projects due to the longer preparation time to develop these projects, 
and once governments’ send out a request for proposals for a specific project, the private sector 
already knows that there is a gap in the financing of these projects (Yun, Jung, Han and Park, 2012). 
4.3. Qualitative results 
The objective of the in-depth interviews conducted with public sector officials was to explore their 
understanding of blended finance and its applicability to Africa’s infrastructure projects. This 
section highlights the profile of the respondents interviewed and the different themes that emerged 
from the different interviews. The findings of the outcome of the study, excluding the profile of the 
respondents, are presented under five key themes, namely: 
1. Understanding of blended finance 
2. The role of MDBs and or DFIs in blended finance 
3. Use of concessional finance or funding as a blended finance tool 
4. Role of government in blended finance structures 
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5. The expectations around blended finance structures 
It should be noted that the verbatim responses of the interviewees were captured in this section. 
4.3.1 Profile of respondents 
In Table 4.4, the demographic details of the respondents are provided with pseudo names given to 
each of the respondents. The researcher also refrained from providing a specific age or the exact 
name of the organisation or country the respondent represented. Ethical clearance for conducting 
the interviews was received from the UCT Graduate School of Business and respondents’ 
permission to interview them was also received. 
In total, 13 individuals were referred for the interview. Unfortunately, only one female out of the 
nine confirmed respondents were available to be interviewed. The researcher was dependent on the 
availability of respondents and the referrals received from the different respondents as per the 
snowball sampling selection method. Four of the nine interviews were conducted telephonically, as 
indicated by the Asterix next to the name. Most of the respondents were between the age of 35 and 
45 with a university degree. 
Table 4.5: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Respondent Gender Age range Public Sector 
A1 Male 35 – 45  Supranational Continental Body 
*A2 Male 35 – 45  Government– Ministry of Treasury 
A3 Male 35 – 45  Government– Ministry of Transport 
A4 Male 35 – 45  Regional Economic Community 
(REC) 
*A5 Male 55 – 65  Regional Economic Community – 
Affiliated Association (REC) 
*A6 Male 45 – 55  MDB 
A7 Male 35 – 45  National DFI 
A8 Female 55 – 65  Advisory Services to Public Sector  
*A9 Male 55 – 65  Government Ministry of Treasury 
 
4.3.2 Understanding of blended finance 
In this section, the key themes emanating from the discussions with respondents regarding their 
understanding of blended finance is presented. The findings highlight that most of the respondents’ 
understanding of blended finance is about (1) mobilising private sector capital by (2) combining 
different sources of funding to (3) reduce the risk for the private sector to invest in infrastructure 
projects or regions where they will not usually invest in. 
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4.3.2.1 Mobilising private sector capital 
Respondents’ overall understanding was that blended finance is an approach to mobilise additiona l 
private sector capital for the development of projects. This perspective of blended finance was 
clearly stipulated by A2 from the government sector. 
Okay, my understanding of blended finance is the use of government and development 
finance to mobilise private sector finance. A way to try and maximise finance for 
development through the private sector. (A2) 
A2’s understanding of blended finance reflected that of several of the respondents and is aligned 
with the original definition provided by the (OECD/WEF, 2015) who focused their definition on 
mobilising private capital flows that would ensure developmental impact. In further support of this 
finding, the Addis Agenda emphasised using blended finance as an instrument to mobilise private 
capital and that it should be used to attract private sector finance for impact across the development 
sectors (OECD, 2018a). 
4.3.2.2 Combination of sources of financing 
While the overall understanding of blended finance is to mobilise private sector capital, an added 
view defined blended finance in line with combining different forms of financing or funding. A few 
of the respondents argued that blended finance is about a “combination of sources of financing” 
(A6) to mobilise or attract private sector participation. 
It is about taking various forms of financing and combining them together to reduce the cost 
of capital for lending into infrastructure projects and other types of projects. And generally, 
it involves three types of financing: One is DFIs, one is donor or philanthropic financing 
and the other is private financing. And if we are lucky, there could be a bit of public 
financing14 blended in as well. (A5) 
…it is a modality of financing development where you structure a combination of sources of 
financing. So, in this case it could be traditional financing from a DFI and private sector 
resources or investments into the capital of the project. (A6) 
The above understanding of blended finance to combine different sources of financing is in line 
with the arguments from several researchers and publications where blended finance is linked to the 
                                                 
14 Reference specifically to government financing 
69 
 
combination of various financing sources (Carter, 2015; Bilal & Krätke, 2013). A different view in 
combining different sources of funding was emphasised by A1 from the supranational body. A1 
argued that blended finance should include “all forms of money, which accompanies or strengthen 
public money… which should also have some sort of a commercial element to it”. A1 emphasised 
the commercial component, as most of the infrastructure projects are still funded by government 
and that not all the projects are of interest to the private sector, noting that the additional funds 
should be in support of strengthening public sector money for infrastructure. 
One respondent (A4) mentioned that his understanding of blended finance is that it is used by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) where you have “a grant, and they will blend it with a loan 
facility”. A4’s understanding of blended finance agrees with various other studies such as Bilal et 
al (2013), Mustapha et al (2014), Ferrer et al. (2011), and Romero et al. (2014). 
4.3.2.3 The risk factors 
A815, on the other hand, argued that the definition of blended finance provided is too narrow and 
needed to include risk mitigation measures as well. 
I had this debate at the UN [inaudible]… about how you define blended finance because the 
public sector definition often says that it is blending private finance with public finance, 
period… That is too a narrow definition because to really have blended finance… you need 
to include risk mitigation.” (A8) 
The focus on risk mitigation measures, as emphasised from a private sector perspective is not 
surprising, as the private sector tend to be risk-averse and will not invest in a project that could 
eventually lead to financial losses. A5 agrees that “blended finance has to be a mechanism [that 
will] reduce the cost of capital primarily by mixing forms of funding which will reduce risk for 
private sector participants”. This rationale for using blended finance as a mitigation tool to de-risk 
investment in developing and emerging markets for infrastructure projects and the private sector is 
shared by the BFT (2018), Tew et al. (2016), and Küblböck & Grohs (2019). 
In summary, it should be noted that eight of the nine respondents could provide an understand ing 
of what blended finance is. All eight respondents had some formal education in finance and work 
in the financing and infrastructure space. A3, who works in the Ministry of Transport and works 
closely with the supranational and regional economic bodies in implementing critical transport 
                                                 




infrastructure projects, could not provide an understanding of blended finance. After explaining the 
concept behind blended finance, A3, however, started linking it with using grants and concessiona l 
funding to bring more private sector investments into infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, most of the respondents had a basic understanding of blended finance, which is 
aligned with the major definitions available in the blended finance sector. The responses, however, 
reflect a lack of a universal definition of blended finance as confirmed by A1 “that there has not 
been a very clear definition of blended finance.” 
4.3.3 The role of MDBs and/ or DFIs 
It is clear from all the respondents that MDBs and DFIs are critical in the blended finance structure, 
especially in supporting governments in developing and achieving their infrastructure goals and in 
crowding in the private sector into these projects. MDBs and DFIs are, in several ways, critical in 
supporting governments, as per the respondents in this study. This theme explores the different roles 
MDBs and DFIs should employ, including providing project preparation funds, making available 
the necessary guarantee products, providing loans, and crowding-in the private sector. The need for 
more coordination and development of partnerships was also highlighted as a key role of the MDBs 
and DFIs.  
The critical roles identified links to the MDBs’ perspective that they are “supposed to be trusted 
advisors as DFIs when [they] go to countries” (A6). This role of DFIs and MDBs acting as trusted 
advisors was also emphasised by A3 who mentioned that “they [MDBs] are key, especially in terms 
of negotiating in some of the projects”. The respondents’ dependency on MDBs and DFIs as trusted 
advisors and negotiators is reflected in a statement made by Giordano and Ruiters (2016) studying 
the role of development finance institutions in post-conflict and fragile situations where they 
emphasised: 
DFIs, like other external actors, do not want to undermine the state-building process. DFIs 
are meant [to] help the private sector enter high-risk markets by facilitating the creation of 
an environment conducive to the protection of private sector investments and interests 
(governance, rule-based structures, etc.), along with the provision of social and 
environmental goods and services. But they have to find ways of doing so without weakening 




In the sections below, the researcher will elaborate in more detail on the roles and functions as 
conveyed by respondents. 
a. Project preparation and development funds 
The respondents emphasised that MDBs and DFIs must disburse more development funds to unlock 
infrastructure projects in the region. A5, from the Regional Economic Affiliated Institution is 
convinced “that DFIs are not playing enough of a catalytic role in order to facilitate project 
development and project preparation which is making the private sector nervous”. The need for 
additional development funding is further emphasised by A4 from the REC who argued that “the 
amount of money that we need to develop the infrastructure is so enormous that what we are getting 
from the donors or from the development banks is not sufficient. It is not enough. It is just a drop in 
the ocean”. 
While the respondents mentioned that the development capital received from the MDBs and DFIs 
are not enough, other respondents articulated that they are receiving the necessary preparation funds 
from these institutions. 
Yes, I mean there is an IPP in a country where they used that kind of [preparation] financing 
where there is a government contribution to the project and the government contribution 
was in the form of a grant from one of the development partners. (A9) 
But we are hoping that with these engagements with the World Bank probably we can 
eventually get some more funding from the likes of the IMF, African Development Bank, 
DBSA to [develop] some of the projects that we have. (A3) 
A6 from the MDB states that “the level of preparation of a project… helps you reduce the level of 
risks because then you have a basic understanding of what the [project] involves and also of cause 
the environmental and social assessments”. 
These confirmations for the need for project preparation by both the government officials and the 
RECs emphasised the importance of project preparation for the development of infrastructure 
projects in Africa, which was highlighted by previous researchers as critical for blended finance 
transactions (Arezki, et al., 2017; Broccolini et al., 2018; Convergence, 2018) It, however, also 
highlights the dependency of governments for project development funds from the MDBs and the 
DFIs and their inability to fund and manage these projects themselves. A4 argued that: 
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…a normal challenge with most of the African countries is that you can prepare a bankable 
project or an investable project, but funding is not immediately available… And that is why, 
most of the projects as I said earlier on, we prepare them, and then they end up in the shelf, 
because the countries they cannot manage. (A4) 
A5 is adamant that blended finance will not be a solution for Africa if you do not have well prepared 
and structured projects. 
My point is the following, you can have as many instruments as you want, if you have not 
sort out the issue of properly prepared projects, properly identified projects, alignment to 
plans and development goals, those things will never be resolved. (A5) 
The above response is in line with research arguing that the lack of bankable projects and the need 
for catalytic finance to prepare projects to a bankable state to crowding- in private sector remains the 
key constraints to finance infrastructure in Africa (Badu, Owusu-Manu, Edwards & Holt, 2013; 
Collier, 2014). 
b. Provider of guarantees and insurance products 
The private sector usually wants comfort that their investments are secured, and they will not suffer 
from unbearable losses when they invest in mostly public sector infrastructure projects in Africa. 
As such, the private sector might request a government guarantee for the project before it is financed. 
According to A5, “[projects] simply just do not get off the ground because the private sector is too 
risk-averse, and government is not willing to put out a government guarantee.” According to many 
of the respondents, the provision of guarantees by countries could be a challenge for African 
countries; hence, some of them are not providing guarantees for projects to be financed and 
implemented. 
Some countries, because of the ratings of their economies and their debt to GDP ratio, 
payment terms, have no sovereign guarantees to provide… Because, in effect, they are not 
dysfunctional, but they are not economically viable to provide any guarantees like Guinea 
Basso, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and so forth. (A1) 
 
Really, it is tough… But it is challenging for a lot of countries because our legal frameworks 
are not that strong. I mean, you have to have recourse as an investor if there is default in 
any part or maybe a change in the operating environment... (A6) 
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This is where the role of the MDBs and the DFIs becomes more important. A2, for example 
mentioned that while his country does provide financial guarantees to “financially stable 
government entities that have strong balance sheets to get financing to do development 
programmes”, they will still tap into “the partial risk guarantees (PRG) from African Development 
Bank” (A2). It should be noted that A2 is situated in a lower-middle-income country that has a 
higher likelihood to provide government guarantees compared to low-income countries, as referred 
to by A1. 
The provision of guarantees has a longstanding history, as mentioned earlier; however, within the 
blended finance structure, it is more emphasised (Convergence, 2018; Tew et al., 2016; Broccolini 
et al., 2018) and is thus, no surprise that guarantees was raised as a need that MDBs must provide. 
The MDB and DFI participants was not wholly convinced that a guarantee is always required. 
If you lend directly to the government, the guarantee is implicit. The Guarantee is ultimately 
a backstop to the government. But, if a project can stand on its own and the cashflow in the 
project is robust, then you do not need a guarantee. You can structure something so that… 
you have sufficient capital that your interest coverage ratio is forever covered. (A7) 
But, I think, if you are an investor and you have done your due diligence, and the legal 
environment of that country allows you to invest and recoup your money and you are 
confident, go and invest without a contingent liability, because your risks will be covered 
through the legal framework . (A6) 
A9 feel that government does not always need to provide the guarantees or tap into any available. 
His biggest challenge is that “governments in Africa do not have any standard in managing 
contingent liabilities. It is something we need to think about and say, how do we minimise from the 
government’s perspective, that risk. So, we put in place mitigation measures”. 
Despite the contradictions in perspectives around the provisions of guarantees, Benn et al. (2017) 
proved that guarantees remain one of the most used instruments, whether from government or 
MDBs, to crowd-in the private sector in blended finance. 
c. Loan provider: “Their role is essentially to make money” 
DFIs and MDBs were acknowledged in many of the interviews as financiers and providers of loans 
to the governments or the private sector to finance the infrastructure projects that were required. 
The DFI Working Group (2017) emphasised in their research that they are a loan provider for 
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development. The DFI respondent argued that once the countries seek financing from a DFI, their 
objective is to find financing that is provided at low cost. 
So, when you are blending, you are looking at DFIs, you are looking at DFIs with much 
cheaper financing, European DFIs who will look at a project and think we have some money 
allocated for grant financing for this kind of projects. (A7) 
A country can borrow from a DFI at lower cost, as opposed to obtaining financing from a 
private investor. (A6) 
Some of the REC and government representatives were not fully convinced and argued that DFIs 
and MDBs are more there for making money than the actual objective of financing the project for 
development. 
I think for them [MDBs/DFIs] it is business as usual. Essentially, they are also looking for 
where to invest. … For example, AfDB will want to focus on the development of the people 
and want to invest in agriculture… And they say that is a project where we are going to put 
in some money. Now, they can give money to government or the private sector, depending 
on who approached them. Their role essentially is to make money, though making money 
with an eye to contributing to the development of the country and the people... But at the end 
of the day, all of it is Money. Because this money they get from somewhere and they have to 
get a return on that money. (A9) 
d. “Crowd-in the private sector as much as you can” 
All the participants agreed that the MDBs and DFIs’ role is to crowd-in the private sector into 
infrastructure projects. The objective, as mentioned by A2 earlier on blended finance, is to crowd-
in the private sector and the MDBs and DFIs have a critical role to play in this space. 
Once you have a DFI which have some capacity and a DFI who has a good brand, once 
they starting to develop projects and talking about investing themselves, the private sector 
will essentially sigh a sense of relieve because they will be saying that the DBSA or the IDC 
or whoever it is have developed this programme or this project and in fact, they must 
understand it. They understand the risk associated with it. Otherwise they would not be 
putting they own cash into it. (A5) 
We are too reward DFIs for doing first loss and that they’re there. The whole incentive 
system and looking at leveraging the private sector. (A8) 
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The DFI and MDB concur that one of the main roles is to crowd-in more private sectors to invest 
into infrastructure projects. This is highlighted in the statements below. 
Of course, there are certain projects that are not lucrative enough for the private sector to 
get in that is basically a market inefficiency. And that is when you have to have a government 
to step in and I [as national DFI] will have to assist in those cases as well. But there are 
some projects that will be easily taken up by the private sector and their efficiencies will be 
increased, making their costs of funding even lower, so you want to crowd-in the private 
sector as much as you can. (A7) 
I think the presence of a DFI is vital for private sector to invest especially where they are 
sceptical of certain rates and do not want to expose themselves fully. In that case, the 
presence of the DFI actually facilitated the investment from the private sector… However, 
for projects which have a very high potential for revenue streams and finance and there is 
private finance that are ready to invest money, I think if our objective is to scale up private 
sector investment, I think DFIs should be able to take a lower portion of financing for those 
projects. Whilst at the same time, I think DFIs are going into a project, looking at the interest 
of a country more than their bottom line in all respect. (A6) 
The above feedback concurs with the result from Jadhyala (2016) and Broccolini (2019) that MDBs 
are critical in attracting private sector participation into infrastructure projects. 
4.3.4 Concessional finance as a blended finance tool 
Concessional finance or blended concessional finance is a core theme described by the DFI Working 
Group (2017) as a tool that is used by MDBs and DFIs to increase private sector participation in 
investments, in partnership with other development partners and donors to mobilise private 
financing for the SDGs. The question which was posed to respondents was “What is your feeling 
towards concessional finance as a tool to support countries financing their infrastructure projects 
and mobilising more private sector investments?” The responses to this question painted mixed 
feelings of using concessional finance as a blended finance tool as it reportedly has an “uneven 
record” according to A5. The researcher will elaborate more on the results below. 
a. Conditions with concessions: “I mean, a beggar has no choice” 
Officials from the government, RECs, and supranational bodies were blunt in their expressions 
towards concessional finance for investments, arguing that while it might be a positive approach to 
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support countries, the conditions associated just to receive the funds does not motivate countries to 
tap into this tool available from development funders. 
And I think we have this notion that the World Bank is doing us a favour through these 
concessional lending and or the ADB [African Development Bank] … All these new 
products, that we think that are favours to us, but they are not favours to us… they are not 
favours because they take the commercial part of the structuring and introduce their 
instruments to make sure it becomes a commercial transaction. And government is left with 
the non-commercial part. (A1) 
A1 specifically stipulates that once a deal is structured at concessional rates, governments are left 
out of the process and left with the “non-commercial parts”. Surprisingly, when asked about her 
feelings about concessional financing, A8 stated that she “thinks when you look at concessional 
financing […] you just have to know that there is no formula answer… When you do a deal, your 
criteria are investibility and you got to bring the government along with you”. After further enquiry 
on this topic, A8 elaborated by stating that “when you talk concessional funding, you need to look 
at project development, are you asking the right questions, are you doing capacity building and 
advisory to the government and the decision-makers, so they don’t do stupid things”. In both A8 
and A1’s responses there is a need for government to be consulted before a concessional financ ing 
approach is discussed or agreed upon for any blended finance structure when investing in Africa. 
This anguish with using concessional funding is further emphasised by the government officia ls 
themselves who argue that concessional funding is too conditional, but in most instances, they do 
not have a choice but to welcome the funding. 
For me, it depends on who is providing the concessional funding. But from my experience, 
we found a lot of conditionalities when it comes to concessional finance. And in most 
instance, even after the signing of the loan agreements, you find that projects kicking off 
commencement of construction, procurement of contractors beginning way later, even two 
years, three years [later]. I have even seen concessional funding that has been signed, but 
nothing is happening on the ground, just because of conditionalities that is placed on this 
kind of financing. (A2) 
Okay, concession funding is basically twofold. It was beneficial on some projects. It was not 
beneficial on other projects So, most of what we have been getting, or most of what we have 
managed to secure as funding came through concessions. So those issues, when you are 
77 
 
trying to negotiate, an investor will come with those issues... If I am going to invest in this, 
these issues should be addressed. That has been the problem… Ja, you are coming for this, 
but you have to meet conditions 1 2 3 and some of them were then political. (A3) 
It depends on where you are getting the concessional funding (from)… They have their own 
conditions and agenda. So, they will say, okay, we give you a loan at 0.75% but this is what 
we want, 1234, some of which can border on your independence. But that is their conditions. 
If you can abide by their conditions, you can get the money…And if you are desperate; I 
mean some countries are in such a need that they have to accept their conditions… So, what 
do you do when you need the money and if their countries and the quality of the products 
from their countries are good enough, why not procure from there? So, if it is a 
conditionality, I mean, a beggar has no choice. (A9) 
According to the respondents above, all from government departments, most countries are in need 
of cheap funding received through concessional loans. The conditions linked to these loans, 
however, tend to hamper their process and become too political. 
b. Concessional rates: The MDB/DFI perspectives 
One would expect that the MDB and DFI will have the same opinion around using concessiona l 
financing to mobilise the private sector. In this study, the MDB and DFI, however, both had separate 
ideas around using concessional financing. A6 argued that concessional funding is necessary in 
Africa, especially when you target low-income countries who are already struggling to manage their 
national budgets. 
So, if the DFI plays a lead arranger on a project and is able to mobilise more concessional 
finance on a project, at the end of the day for the African context where we still have a lot 
of low-income countries or users and end-users that may have issues with affordability. By 
having concessional funding in a project. For low-income countries, absolutely. I think for 
higher-income countries, maybe not. (A6) 
A6 argues that concessional finance could only improve the financial status for low-income 
countries when financing their infrastructure or capital investments. A7 from the DFI, however, 
argued that concessional funding “is not going to crowd-in the private sector, unless you consider 
the private sector to be guys like Bill Gates or foundations who are willing to give additional 
philanthropic free money”. He further stated that: 
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…concessional financing can distort the market. So, if you look at Namibia and you are 
financing a road using concessional financing, we cannot get concessional financing to 
finance a road in Namibia as a {local DFI}. But if MDB, for example, come in financing a 
road through concessional financing in Namibia, and we are supposed to compete against 
MDB, there is no ways we will win. So, they have crowded us out. (A7) 
A7, however, later did argue that if the MDB packaged the project in such a way where they provide 
a blended solution to the government where everyone on the spectrum, both the local DFIs and the 
private sector has a role to play in the structure and blend this with MDB concessional financing, 
only then can the blended solution work. 
c. IDA funds – concessional tool 
As part of the interviews, the researcher explored the respondents’ thoughts on the IDA instrument 
of the World Bank. Not everyone worked with the IDA, as confirmed by A9 who stated that he is 
“aware of it, but personally have not come across it”. Overall, the IDA is viewed as a valuable 
concessional tool of the World Bank to not only “crowd-in the private sector” (A2), but also to 
“help in graduating those countries in low-income status to a higher-income levels” (A6). The 
private sector felt that while this is a useful tool, it, however, is underused with more coordination 
being required to really ensure countries and the private sector could benefit from this instrument. 
A5 claimed that the IDA “could help you reduce your capital” and further concluded that “if we 
brought all those things (IDA) together with other DFIs, with private finance, you should be able to 
get a bankable project”. These perspectives on the IDA is in agreement with Delmon’s (2007) 
perspective that the IDA is a useful tool to mobilise private finance for investments. 
4.3.5 Government’s role in blended finance structures  
On the question about the governments’ specific role in a blended finance structure, it was argued 
by most of the respondents that governments’ main role is to create the enabling environment for 
the private sector to come in and invest in those projects. 
I think what they should do is perhaps creating an enabling environment to law, to provide 
the necessary guarantees to attract private capital as a form of blended finance and also to 




So, government has a bigger role in enhancing blended finance. In essence, through 
communication through policy, through commitment at the highest level. And also, to create 
a political stable environment, a credible environment, a macro stable economy. So, the 
government has a big role to play to enable blended finance. (A2) 
A5 and A4, however, added that except for creating the necessary policy and enabling environment, 
governments in Africa must also contribute (financially) to these projects and be capacitated to do 
so. In this sense, the project will be more blended and government could take on some form of 
accountability for this project to succeed. 
They have to contribute in one way or the other and I am sure that is now maybe the blended 
financing is also coming in, whereby you are saying okay, we got something to contribute. 
But for you to be responsible, you [Government] also have to contribute in something [into] 
this. (A4) 
And then you will have to have Government’s own commitment to its portion of the funding. 
(A5) 
The DFIs and MDBs are saying that once governments are contributing more to infrastructure 
projects, they will be crowding out the private sector 
…so ultimately the government’s role is to basically have an enabling environment. If the 
governments’ role is to start financing projects, it is ultimately crowding out the private 
sector.” (A7) 
Capacity constraints remain rife in the government and most of the respondents argued that even 
they wanted to play a bigger role in investing in infrastructure projects in Africa. They prefer to 
crowd-in more of the private sector, especially since most of the infrastructure are currently still 
being financed by the governments. 
So, most African Governments are stuck, right. There are those that manage the hurdle and 
then we go into managing the actual project, the construction of it. We are not good at that. 
(A1) 
First of all, the development architecture back to the skills issue. You have deskilled Africa, 
because you are importing all the professionals, the highly specialized professionals that 
you need to identify developer’s mitigation and financing factors. (A8) 
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Excluding creating the enabling environment, A5 and A4 also argued that government should 
identify projects and commit these projects to their national development plans, which will provide 
investors more comfort knowing that these are projects that are of value to governments. A2 went 
so far to argue that governments must be a bit more proactive and identify projects that are 
commercially viable in high-return areas. A2 argued that “it is all about getting commercial private 
financing investing in high return areas or economically viable projects that has high impact in 
terms of development.” 
4.3.6 The expectations in employing a blended finance structure 
On the question, whether blended finance structures could benefit African countries in developing 
the infrastructure environment, respondents responded positively with the hope that by employing 
these structures in the infrastructure investment space, they hope that it could reduce the public debt 
levels of countries. 
Blended finance, if properly used, can help reduce public debt . (A2) 
Because we want to find a blended finance solution, especially in the SADC region. What 
we found is that for many countries in this region, the treasury is bare… I mean, there is 
some public funding, but it is extremely limited (A5) 
Others were focusing on strengthening the local capital markets. 
Ultimately, we would like to see more impact from regional banks and regional investors. 
For example, if we look at the SADC region, instead of going to Malawi and expecting 
Malawian companies to put in money, and there are not many that have the ability or the 
muscle to invest in such large projects. But if you look regional, we are eventually going to 
support the development of regional firms, investors and institutions that are able to invest 
regionally and are able to go into blended finance. So, the regional institutions that have 
that capacity will make that difference for Africa if we want to advance blended financing 
and PPPs in Africa. (A6) 
However, a blended finance solution must be an agreement between DFIs that are 
international and local DFIs that are saying this is how we are going to finance certain 
projects. You identify a sector, you say transport sector, I have appetite for X amount of 
money for these countries and these kinds of transport projects etc. We have an excellent 
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footprint in Africa. We are here in Africa, we know all the governments, we know all the 
projects. (A7) 
Then they got some working capital loan from locally, because they needed capital to pay 
for the local costs, you know the labour, mobilisation and that kind of stuff. And then they 
also brought in some local partners who also brought in some money. So that is the kind of 
– not using one source of funding, but various sources of funding. That is a typical case of 
blended finance… (A9) 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, both the qualitative and quantitate data analysis was provided using thematic 
qualitative analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Step four of the CPD requires an 
interpretation of the merged results. The next chapter summarises and interprets the separate results 
and discuss how the data diverge or relate to provide a more complete understanding of blended 
finance in Africa. The study concludes with recommendations for future research and a principled 





DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research exploring using blended finance for private sector 
participation investing in infrastructure projects in Africa. The findings presented in Chapter 4 of 
this study informs this discussion, the key principles, and policy recommendations for using blended 
finance for infrastructure projects in Africa. This chapter concludes with the avenues for future 
research. 
5.2 Summary and conclusions of the study 
This study employed the convergent parallel mixed research method that required the researcher to 
follow concurrently a quantitative and qualitative process during the design phase of the research, 
the data collection, and analysis phases for both methods. For the quantitative approach, the WB 
PPI database was sourced as its core database, complimented by the World Bank’s Internationa l 
Debt Statistics (IDS) database, and the World Bank’s database on the SDGs. A mixed method design 
allowed the researcher to combine hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing within one research 
study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
To investigate the extent of PPI in infrastructure projects in Africa (hypothesis testing), the statistica l 
computerised system, Stata version 15.0 was applied and a descriptive statistics and multiple linear 
regression model were employed for analysis. Nine in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with selected respondents for the qualitative component of this study to explore the 
respondents’ understanding of and experience with blended finance. The semi-structured interviews 
were transcribed and analysed using Straus and Corbin’s (1998) coding techniques with the support 
of the NVIVO 12 pro CAQDAS programme from which several themes emerged (hypothesis 
generating), representing their understanding and perceptions of blended finance and its 
applicability to financing Africa’s infrastructure. 
5.2.2 Interpretation of the merged results 
The mixed research method requires one to summarise and interpret the results separately, which 
was conducted in Chapter 4, and further, to discuss how the data diverge, relate, differ, and or 
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provide a more complete understanding of blended finance for Africa’s infrastructure projects. Th is 
section aims to provide a summative merged interpretation of the findings in Chapter 4. 
The qualitative results emulated the diverse understandings of blended finance among the different 
respondents, confirming that there is no universal definition for blended finance. Most of the 
respondents, however, could provide an understanding of blended finance that was linked to the 
dominant definitions currently in the market; whether it is the one provided by the DFI Working 
Group, Addis Agenda, recent OECD definition, or BFT. The lack of a universal understanding or 
definition, however, leaves room for different interpretations of how blended finance should be 
structured for Africa’s infrastructure projects and the expectations from the different role players. It 
could be summarised that the respondents’ understanding of blended finance is that it is to  (1) 
mobilise or leverage private sector capital by (2) combining different sources of funding that could 
include commercial, public, and or philanthropic development capital to (3) reduce the risks for the 
private sector or to share the risks (and returns) between the different role players, including the 
private sector. 
The quantitative results showed that the extent of private sector participation investing into Africa’s 
infrastructure projects averaged around 88% according to the descriptive analysis, with only 33% 
on average observed to have received MDB support in these projects. The inferential statistic s 
indicated that there was a significant negative relationship of MDB support observed with the 
private sector’s participation in infrastructure projects in Africa. This highlighted that there was a 
lower rate of private sector participation in infrastructure projects that were receiving MDB support. 
The results proved to be in line with the older studies conducted on MDBs mobilising private sector 
investments but is in contrast with more of the recent research arguing that MDBs is playing a 
significant role in mobilising the private sector into infrastructure projects. The difference compared 
to the latter results could be attributed to the fact that most of the recent studies took a bird’s-eye 
view in analysing MDBs support from a global perspective in mobilising the private sector into 
infrastructure projects. This study focused on projects specifically in Africa, which can be argued 
to be a significant contribution to the knowledge paradigm exploring the extent of private sector 
investments into Africa’s infrastructure projects linked to MDB support and blended finance.  
The increase in private sector participation investing in infrastructure projects in Africa with limited 
support from MDBs can be because (1) MDBs are playing more of a catalytic role supporting 
governments in ensuring that projects are bankable and providing the necessary expertise and 
products (e.g. political risk guarantees) for the private sector to participate in these projects; (2) the 
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MDBs are participating in these projects but are taking a lower stake or portion in the debt or equity 
structure (concessional support) of the projects while the projects are driven by the private sector; 
or (3) a decrease in MDBs support could be an indication that more private sector investments are 
entering Africa’s infrastructure markets, as highlighted by the descriptive results. This allows MDBs 
to focus on those countries and projects who need their assistance more, such as the LDCs, which 
received about a third of the private sector participation investments into infrastructure projects out 
of the 644 observations. 
While the mean results from the quantitative analysis indicated high private sector participation in 
projects in Africa, the respondents emphasised that the MDBs role is to crowd-in more private 
participation into Africa’s infrastructure projects. The reasons provided, included that MDBs have 
a catalytic role to play in mobilising the private sector into these projects and act as an advisor for 
government and a negotiator between government and the private sector. It was further argued that 
within the blended finance structure, the MDBs are there to provide the necessary technica l 
assistance through project development or preparation funds, which must be increased. MDBs 
should provide the necessary risk and insurance guarantees or products, which most governments 
in Africa do not have the capacity to provide. The latter products were identified in Chapter 2 as 
key instruments for a blended finance structure. 
Concessional debt had a negative, yet insignificant relationship with private sector participat ion 
investing in infrastructure projects in Africa according to the inferential statistics. Interviewees, 
however, were passionate in their responses on using concessional funding as a structur ing 
instrument for blended finance. The results from the interviews revealed that while concessiona l 
funding does have its benefits in providing cheap money and support to countries and projects with 
high debt levels, the condition precedents (CPs) associated with concessional funding bordered, 
according to some, on their independence, becomes political, and could create further delays in the 
implementation of a project. It was emphasised, however, that due to the limitations of most 
countries, in most cases, they do not have a choice but to accept the concessional funding being 
offered and implement the CPs, which they do not necessarily agree with, for the sake of 
development and economic growth. 
Similarly, countries receiving IDA or IDA blended financing support were observed to have a lower 
likelihood of attracting private participation in infrastructure investments compared to non-IDA 
countries. It is possible that this negative relationship is because not everyone is aware of the IDA 
facilities of the World Bank as confirmed by some of the interview respondents. The results prove 
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to be a noteworthy indication to the World Bank and its subsidiary, the IFC, to market its IDA 
private sector window more available as a blended finance instrument that is targeting specifica lly 
low-income countries. Aligned to the lack of private sector participation in lower-income countries, 
the results of this research are showing that there is a high likelihood that upper middle-income 
countries will receive significantly less private sector participation compared to lower-income 
countries. This confirms that lower-middle- income countries are still the largest recipients of private 
participation investing in infrastructure projects in Africa. The latter further emphasises the need for 
a more focused approached in mobilising private sector participation in infrastructure projects into 
lower-income countries in Africa. 
The support of government in attracting private sector participation had a negative and no significant 
relationship as a factor influencing private sector participation investing in infrastructure projects in 
Africa. This is because the private sector is not expecting much financial contribution from the 
governments of the different countries, but rather, as confirmed by most of the respondents in the 
interviews, they should provide the enabling environment for commercial and institutional investors 
to invest in infrastructure projects in Africa. According to the respondents, governments are required 
to be more capacitated in the financing and implementation process of infrastructure projects and 
be motivated to identify projects that are commercially viable in high-return areas, which will attract 
private sector participation. According to the regression model, there is a positive significant 
relationship for private sector participation investing in infrastructure projects to occur more in 
western and eastern African countries, compared to the Central African region. 
Variables, which were not elevated or discussed in detail during the qualitative interviews include 
the status of projects, the type of projects, primary sectors, type of proposal, FDI, income groups 
(referred to above) and geographic regions (referred to above). Compared to the ICT sector, the 
energy sector, as anticipated, is still the dominant sector in which the private sector tends to 
participate, indicating a weak positive and significant relationship. The results concur with most of 
the studies discussed in this research and is in line with most of the blended finance investment 
sectors targeted. The research also confirms a weak positive but not significant focus in the water 
sector compared to the ICT sector, identifying a space in which blended finance could play a more 
prominent role. The descriptive results indicated that the most recurring investments, according to 
the median, are more towards greenfield projects, while management and lease contracts showed a 
significant negative relationship compared to greenfield projects and a significant positive 




It is not surprising that the results showed a negative significant relationship between solicited bids 
and private sector investing in infrastructure projects, highlighting that the private sector is not 
always keen to bid for government-published projects but would rather approach the public sector 
with a new project for development and skip the procurement process (unsolicited bids) and 
competition. In mobilising the private sector for blended finance structures, if the project is a public 
sector project, the procurement processes is inevitable in most instances. 
5.2.3 Summary 
The research could not prove conclusively that blended finance crowd-in more private sector 
participation into Africa’s infrastructure projects. This could be because a limited number of 
variables were identified and were blended finance project specific. For example, the data missed 
the inclusion of the different credit enhancement instruments used in blended finance structures 
linked to specific projects. What is interesting from the merged results mentioned above, is that 
most of the core variables that should have had a positive impact from a blended finance perspective 
in mobilising private participation investing in infrastructure projects in Africa, proved to have a 
negative relationship in the regression model, as captured in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Core Variable and its Relationship with PPI in Infrastructure 
Source: Authors compilation 
Core blended finance  
variables explored 
Expectation – 
Relationship with PRIV 
Result – relationship with 
PRIV 
MDB_Support A significant positive  
relationship with PRIV 
Negative significant 
relationship with PRIV 
Concession A significant positive  
relationship with PRIV 
Negative with no significant 
relationship with PRIV 
IDA and IDA blended 
financing 
A significant negative 
relationship with PRIV 
Negative significant 
relationship with PRIV 
Government Support A significant positive  
relationship with PRIV 
Negative, with no significant 
relationship with PRIV 
 
For blended finance to really be a benefit for Africa, and maybe turn out to have a more positive 
relationship between the above variables and private sector participation in this space, respondents 
provided the following expectations: 
• Blended finance should be structured in such a way that it assists in reducing the debt levels 
of African countries; 
• Blended finance structures should assist in strengthening the local capital markets by: 
o advancing blended finance through local regional banks, institutions, and investors; 
87 
 
o strengthening the partnership between the local DFIs and international DFIs in the 
implementation and structuring of blended finance projects for a country or a region;  
and 
o blended finance should include the application of various sources of funding, 
including the funding sourced from local partners, using and including local currency 
in the blended finance structures. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
The policy recommendations to mobilise additional private participation investing into Africa’s 
infrastructure through a blended finance approach is discussed in this section aligned with the 
principles set out by the OECD (2018b). 
Principle 1: Anchor blended finance used to a development rationale 
As a key policy recommendation, blended finance structures or approaches should be aligned to the 
objectives set in a country’s national development plans, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 , and the 
2030 SDGs. This would enable all relevant parties to consider the development and economic needs 
of the country and the region in achieving the global development goals to leave no one behind and 
in the process, unlock additional donor funding for the specific projects identified. 
Principle 2: Design blended finance to increase the mobilisation of commercial finance 
This is a twofold recommendation. First, blended finance efforts should invest in those sectors that 
will ensure the highest development impact with the best risk-return opportunities for both the public 
and the private sectors. This could be achieved by identifying a pipeline of projects in high economic 
return or economically viable areas that blended finance approaches should target. 
Second, blended finance instruments, such as the provision of guarantees and project preparation 
funds and facilities should be increased to open the market for commercial funders to invest in 
infrastructure projects in Africa. If governments are to provide these guarantees, it will require the 
development of a set of standards that will assist in managing and monitoring the contingent 
liabilities of each country. 
Principle 3: Tailor blended finance to the local context 
Local investors should be capacitated to participate and invest in blended finance structures for 
infrastructure projects in Africa. As mentioned earlier, this includes strengthening the local capital 
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markets by exploring using local currency for projects, including local DFIs, institutional investors , 
and local commercial banks in the blended finance structures. A blended local developed fund could 
be created by the African public and commercial institutions in which local investors can tap as a 
source of funds to invest in public sector infrastructure projects on the continent. 
 Principle 4: Focus on effective partnering for blended finance 
Linked to Principle 3, DFIs are instruments of the state and MDBs, philanthropist, and foreign 
investors should be committed to collaborate with the local DFIs and public institutions in driving 
the blended finance agenda within African countries. Partnering more effectively with the local 
DFIs (who could also function as local funding arrangers), public institutions, and the local 
commercial banks could only result in increased economic growth for the different African 
countries. 
Principle 5: Monitor blended finance for transparency and results 
The policy recommendation for this principle are threefold. One, blended finance should be defined 
by what one must do to meet investing requirements and those requirements should be modelled on 
the rating criteria provided by the rating agencies. This policy recommendation can exclude lower-
income countries due to their high perceived political and credit risk ratings. By ensuring that all 
parties involved are partnering effectively to support these countries to achieve those investment 
criteria, with concessional and donor support, which are not stringent, most countries, however, 
could adopt this policy. This will also ensure that projects that are financed are those projects that 
are needed for a country and are in line with the sustainable development principles. 
Two, MDBs, DFIs, and the blended finance actors should make the instruments used in their 
different blended finance structure for the specific projects more transparent for a more consistent 
and open database to be developed. This will allow for lessons to be learnt and successful projects 
to be replicated in other areas or sectors that can only increase the development impact. 
Third, a common understanding of blended finance should be adopted to ensure the right 
instruments are in play and the right criteria are being measured when blended finance projects are 
being implemented. 
New Principle 6: Investing in supporting and capacitating African governments 
From outcomes of the qualitative research, African governments do require additional capacity to 
achieve the 2030 SDGs, and more so, to understand the new innovative funding mechanisms such 
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as blended finance, that can assist them in achieving their national, regional, and global goals. As 
such, as a final recommendation, concessional and technical assistance support for any public sector 
project should be accompanied with a capacity-building programme for public sector officials and 
advisory services to the government and the decision-makers involved in these projects. These 
services could easily be rendered by international MDBs and local DFI’s. This will result in public 
sector officials being empowered to create the enabling regulatory environment that is required for 
capital investments into infrastructure projects needed for their countries. 
5.4 Avenues for future research 
Even though the concept of blended finance is not new, its application in the 21st century while 
many countries are facing several environmental, economic, and social challenges, is demanding 
much more in-depth research on an array of topics, specifically in Africa. As a starting point, the 
key limitation for this research is the lack of high quality, robust, and detailed datasets that could be 
tapped into, which specifically focused on blended finance, and which is publicly available. 
Convergence provides an annual trends analysis of the publicly available data that they collect, 
while the OECD and the DFI Working Group survey their regular members to explore and report 
on their blended finance activities. 
A focus on the standardisation of a guarantee mechanism that will assist in monitoring the 
contingent liabilities of the various countries, is a required research piece to inform developing 
countries on how best they can manage their contingent liabilities when approached for a guarantee. 
Simultaneously, a review of the impact of concessional funding and the IDA in African countries is 
required to ensure these instruments are optimally used as blended finance instruments when 
investing in and supporting African countries. Emphasis and future research are also needed on the 
role of local DFIs in the blended finance structure and how they can effectively partner with 
international organisations to invest in blended finance vehicles. 
Finally, there is limited empirical research on blended finance on the market. This empirical research 
on blended finance in Africa thus provide supporting evidence towards the small body of empirica l 
knowledge focusing on blended finance, specifically in the African market. More in-depth research 
is required to explore the various blended finance activities in Africa and the development impact 
of these blended finance structures on alleviating the burden of financing the infrastructure projects 
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Annexure A: Historical events and the rise of blended finance 
YEAR ACTIVITY 
1948 Blended finance instruments were used by the USA’s ECA while administering the 
Marshall Plan.  
1950’s Establishment of the IFC, a DFI of the World Bank – stakeholders in blended finance 
structures. 
1960’s European countries directing aid through bilateral DFIs encouraging them to invest in the 
infrastructure sectors in developing countries. 
1995 to 
1998 
ODA flows decline and the role of DFIs and private sector flows to developing countries 
are emphasised by donor countries and the UN. 
2002 Monterrey Consensus, the initial UN Financing for Development agreement highlights 
the importance of international support for leveraging aid resources, risk guarantees and 
funding for the feasibility studies to assist the private sector. 
2006 EU introduces and commits to scale up blended finance for development in its 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2007–2013 (now replaced by 2014–2020 version). 
2007 EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund launched. 
2008 Establishment of blended finance unit at IFC 
to consolidate existing activities. 
2011 EU Agenda for Change pledges to scale up existing successful blending 
operations. Meanwhile, several DFIs commit to the Busan Partnership Agreement 
on Aid Effectiveness and principles of development cooperation. 
2012 EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation launched to coordinate efforts 
across all EU blending facilities 
2013 OECD develops, and 
G20 leaders endorse, the High level Principles on Long-Term Investment Financing by 
Institutional Investors. 
2014 G20 leaders establish Global Infrastructure Initiative to support public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). Launch of Redesigning Development Finance Initiative, a joint 
project between the OECD and WEF that promotes blended finance 
and calls for more partnerships with private investors 
 
2015 Adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on 
Financing for Development, 2015. The Action Agenda establishes a strong foundation to 
support the implementation of the UN 2030 SDG and refers to blended finance as a tool 
to the finance the SDGs 
2015 The launch of the WEF/OECD SDIP, a global independent platform of 42 public, private 
and philanthropic institutions with the shared ambition to scale finance for the SDGs and 
overcome the barriers hindering private investments in emerging and developing 
countries 
2016 Convergence, global network for blended finance, officially launched as the world’s first 
deal sourcing platform that helps public and private investors find and connect with each 
other for blended finance investments in emerging and frontier markets. 
2017 BFT, launched by the Business and Sustainable Development Commission, was 
established to help mobilise largescale capital for the UN SDGs 
2018 Adoption of the Tri Hita Karana Roadmap of the OECD in the margins of the World 
Bank /IMF Fall meetings in 2018. The objective is to highlight a common framework for 
mobilising additional financing for the SDGs through a multi-stakeholder process.  
2019 First blended finance in Africa Conference held in the London, United Kingdom. 
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Appendix B: Sampled Countries from WB PPI Database 
The regions refer to the names used in the WB PPI database16 and is aligned to the World Bank 
Development Indicators (2017) 






Algeria North Africa Upper-Income Level 28 
Angola Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income Level 10 
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 3 
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income Level 1 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 5 
Cameroon  Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 15 
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 4 
Central African 
Republic 
Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 1 
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 3 
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo17 
Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 4 
Republic of Congo18 Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 8 
Côte d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 24 
Djibouti North Africa Lower-middle-income 5 
Egypt, Arab Republic North Africa Lower-middle-income 53 
    
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 4 
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income Level 15 
Gambia Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 4 
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 29 
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 5 
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 29 
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 6 
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 10 
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 6 
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 3 
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 2 
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income Level 14 
Morocco North Africa Low Income 21 
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 19 
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income Level 7 
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 2 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 53 
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 14 
                                                 
16 The WB PPI database list both the MENA and Northern Africa Countries under one banner. In this case, all  
countries under the MENA banner was removed to focus only on African countries.  
17 Listed on the WB PPI as Congo, Dem, Republic  
18 Listed on the WB PPI as Congo, Republic  
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São Tomé and Principe Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 1 
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 29 
Seychelles Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income Level 3 
Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 4 
Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 5 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper-Income level 91 
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 4 
Swaziland/Eswatini Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 1 
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 32 
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 7 
Tunisia North Africa Upper-Income Level 7 
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Low Income 35 
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Lower-middle-income 10 























Appendix C: High-level questions for Semi-structured interviews 
 
1. What is your understanding of blended finance? 
2. How can blended finance be applied in the African context, especially in the infrastructure 
sectors? 
3. Does blended finance instruments benefit African countries? Name a few instruments and 
examples. Explain why you say so? 
4. What is the role of the MDBs in following a blended finance approach? 
5. Is concessional funding, as a blended finance mechanism, an effective approach to support 
countries financing their infrastructure? Why do you say so? 
6. Are there other financing mechanisms that you are aware of that can be more beneficial for 
African countries to finance their infrastructure? If so, please provide an example and 
motivate your reason for saying so? 
7. The objective of blended finance is to crowd-in more of the private sector investments into 
spaces in which the private sector does not invest. What are your thoughts around this 
understanding? 
8. Are you aware of the IDA instrument of the World Bank? If so, what are your thoughts 
around the IDA instrument as a blended finance mechanism for infrastructure projects? 
 
